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1CAUSATION AND ATTENUATION 
IN THE SLAVERY REPARATIONS DEBATE  
Kaimipono David Wenger*
Recent discussions of reparations have noted the difficulty 
reparations advocates have in showing causation.  Criticisms of 
reparations have focused on the attenuated nature of the harm, 
suggesting that modern claimants are not connected to slaves, that 
modern payers are not connected to slave owners, and that modern 
disadvantages cannot be connected to slavery.  
This Article examines attenuation concerns and finds that they 
come in three related but distinct varieties:  Victim attenuation, 
wrongdoer attenuation, and act attenuation.  These three components, 
defined in this Article, show themselves in a number of interrelated 
legal and moral arguments.  They have important strategic 
consequences, and operate together to create a formidable obstacle 
for reparations. 
This Article then discusses how ideas on causation from the mass 
tort context can address legal problems of attenuation in reparations.  
Mass tort cases have developed novel methods of showing causation, 
such as statistical evidence, and these tools can be used in the 
reparations context.  By using the tools of mass torts, it is possible for 
reparations advocates to show causation.
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The case for slavery reparations is failing.  Scholars continue to 
write about reparations,1 but they increasingly seem to be the only 
ones on the bandwagon.  The media is sometimes ambivalent and 
occasionally hostile.2  The lukewarm media reception mirrors societal 
feelings in general.3  Reparations claims have failed in the courts,4 and 
1 See generally Kaimipono David Wenger, Slavery as a Takings Clause 
Violation, 53 Am. U. L. Rev. 191, 193 nn. 4-5 (collecting legal scholarship 
addressing reparations); Alfred L. Brophy, Reparations Talk: Reparations for Slavery 
and the Tort Law Analogy, 24 B.C. Third World L.J. 81, 82-84 (2003) (noting 
advances in reparations discussion) [hereinafter Brophy, Reparations Talk]; Alfred 
Brophy, Some Conceptual and Legal Problems in Reparations for Slavery, 58 NYU 
Ann. Surv. Am. L. 497, 505 (2002) (discussing development of reparations theory) 
[hereinafter Brophy, Some Problems].
 Some of the major reparations pieces in recent years include Randall 
Robinson, The Debt: What America Owes to Blacks (1999); Should America Pay?: 
Slavery and the Raging Debate on Reparations (Raymond A. Winbush ed., 2003) 
[hereinafter Should America Pay?]; Mari J. Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom: Critical 
Legal Studies and Reparations, 22 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 323 (1987); and 
reparations symposia at New York University, see Symposium, A Dream Deferred: 
Comparative and Practical Considerations for the Black Reparations Movement, 58 
N.Y.U. Ann. Surv. Am. L. 447 (2002), at the University of Memphis, see 
Symposium, 33 U. Mem. L. Rev. 245 (2003), and at Boston University, see
Symposium, __ B.U. L. Rev. __ (forthcoming 2004).  Modern legal reparations 
literature is generally acknowledged to have begun with professor Boris Bittker’s 
work.  See Boris Bittker, The Case for Black Reparations (Beacon Press 2003) 
(1973).
2 See, e.g., Kevin Merida, Did Freedom Alone Pay a Nation’s Debt?; Rep. John 
Conyers Jr. Has a Question, He’s Willing to Wait a Long Time for the Right 
Answer, Wash. Post, Nov. 23, 1999, at C-01; see also Vincene Verdun, If the Shoe 
Fits, Wear It:  An Analysis of Reparations to African Americans, 67 Tul. L. Rev. 
597, 607 n.29 (collecting media accounts); Wenger, supra note 1, at 195 nn. 6-7 
(same).
3
 Polls show that overwhelming majorities of whites oppose reparations, while 
Blacks support reparations.  See Michael Kranish, Blacks Rally on Capital for 
Slavery Reparations: Farrakhan Seeks Transfer of Land, Boston Globe, Aug. 18 
2002, at A3 (discussing these findings from the CNN/USA Today/Gallup Poll); 
Alfred Brophy, The Cultural War Over Reparations for Slavery, 53 DePaul L. Rev. 
1181, 1182-85 (discussing statistics) [hereinafter Brophy, Cultural War]; see also
Lee A. Harris, “Reparations” as a Dirty Word:  The Norm Against Slavery 
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proposed legislation has failed to advance in the legislature.5  A 
disjunct exists between scholarly writing and the real world.6 One 
source of this disjunct is the difficulty reparations advocates have in 
establishing causation.  This Article will address the unique problems 
of causation and attenuation that arise in the reparations context.
Causation is a familiar concept to legal scholars.  Tort liability 
requires a showing of proximate causation.7  Claimants must show not 
only conceptual “but-for” causation — that “but for” a party’s actions, 
the harm would not have occurred — but must also establish legally 
actionable “proximate cause.”8  In reparations, the attenuated nature of 
the harm makes it difficult to show proximate cause.9
Reparations, 33 U. Mem. L. Rev. 409, 410 n.9 (discussing these and other poll 
results).  See generally Taunya Lovell Banks, Exploring White Resistance to Racial 
Reconciliation in the United States, 55 Rutgers L. Rev. 903, 915-19 (2003) 
(discussing demographics of Americans opposed to reparations).
4 See Cato v. United States, 70 F.3d 1103, 1108-10 (9th Cir. 1995); In re 
African-American Slave Descendants Litigation, 304 F. Supp. 2d 1027 (N.D. Ill. 
2004).
5
 Representative John Conyers (D. Mich.) first introduced a bill in 1989 that 
would have established a commission to study the effects of slavery and recommend 
appropriate remedies. The bill died in committee, and has been reintroduced (and 
repeatedly killed) every Congress since then. See H.R. 3745, 101st Cong. (1989); 
H.R. 1684, 102d Cong. (1991); H.R. 40, 103d Cong. (1993); H.R. 891, 104th Cong. 
(1995); H.R. 40, 105th Cong. (1997); H.R. 40, 106th Cong. (1999); H.R. 40, 107th 
Cong. (2001); H.R. 40, 108th Cong. (2003). Representative Conyers has stated, “I 
have re-introduced H.R. 40 every Congress since 1989, and will continue to do so 
until it’s passed into law.” John Conyers, Jr., Major Issues—Reparations: The 
Commission to Study Reparations Proposals for African Americans Act, at 
http://www.house.gov/conyers/news_ reparations.htm.  See also Verdun, supra note 
2, at 606-07 & n. 28 (discussing proposed legislation); Wenger, supra note 1, at 194 
n.6 (same).
6 Cf. Brophy, Reparations Talk, supra note 1, at 83-86.
7 See, e.g., Guido Calabresi, Concerning Cause and the Law of Torts: An Essay 
for Harry Kalven, Jr., 43 U. Chi. L. Rev. 69, 69-72 (1975); Richard W. Wright, 
Causation in Tort Law, 73 Cal. L. Rev. 1735, 1737-39 (1985).
8 See Elizabeth C. Price, Toward A Unified Theory of Products Liability: 
Reviving the Causative Concept of Legal Fault, 61 Tenn. L. Rev. 1277, 1347 (1994) 
(“‘Cause-in-fact,’ ‘factual cause,’ or ‘but for’ causation, as every first-year law 
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Attenuation is diminished or failed causation.  It is a failure of 
closeness, which can be created by distance, time, or the intervening 
student knows, is generally an indispensable requisite to recovery in tort. It is the 
first head of the two-headed hydra of causation. The other head . . .is ‘proximate’ or 
‘legal’ cause, a policy tool designed to cut off liability for acts perceived as too 
remote, attenuated, or mere conditions.”); Kim Forde-Mazrui, Taking Conservatives 
Seriously: A Moral Justification for Affirmative Action and Reparations, 92 Cal. L. 
Rev. 683, 727 (2003) (“Actual causation is but a starting point for establishing 
responsibility, making the causal agent ‘eligible’ for responsibility.”). W. Page 
Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts 264 (1984) (“As a practical 
matter, legal responsibility must be limited to those causes which are so closely 
connected with the result and of such significance that the law is justified in 
imposing liability.”).  Thus, the law generally treats as actionable those 
“consequences which follow in unbroken sequence, without an intervening efficient 
cause, from the original negligent act.”  See 57A Am. Jur. 2d Negligence § 491.  
“For such consequences the original wrongdoer is responsible, even though he or she 
could not have foreseen the particular results which did follow or results of a similar 
nature.”  Id.
The problem of attenuation, and its relation to causation, can be illustrated by a 
quick example.  In a scenario where Martha shoots John in the chest, and he 
immediately dies, we may say that there is likely to be a causal chain between her 
shot and his death.  However, imagine another scenario, where Martha shoots John 
in the chest, and he walks away.  He then plays basketball the next day; he goes sky 
diving and scuba diving; he gets into a car accident.  Five days later, John dies.  In 
the second scenario, the causal chain is far more attenuated.  Perhaps we can infer 
that Martha’s shot caused John’s eventual death, but there could have been other 
factors involved:  physical exertion, other trauma, natural causes.  The number of 
intermediate steps between the initial act and the manifestation of the harm create 
attenuation.  See also Keeton et al., supra, at 301-08 (discussing intervening causes); 
Oscar S. Gray, The Law of Torts 86-87 (1986) (discussing proximate cause).  
9 In the words of one critic, reparations advocates point to an injury which is 
not “fairly traceable to slavery through a chain that contains no links of independent 
causation.”  Calvin Massey, Some Thoughts on the Law and Politics of Reparations 
for Slavery, 24 B.C. Third World L.J. 157, 166 (2004); see also id. (“I am 
contending only that the nexus between slavery and the present forces that produce 
the sense of injustice felt by black Americans today is too attenuated to merit a 
judicial award of damages based on restitution.”); see infra § I.B. (discussing 
attenuation in reparations literature).
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actions of others.10  Attenuation is a conceptual separation between 
two actors or events, a dilution or weakening of any connection that 
they may have.  And because it weakens the connection between two 
actors or events, attenuation can sever conceptual but-for causation 
from proximate cause.  
In this Article, I turn an analytical eye to attenuation arguments 
used in the reparations debate, defining and examining different types 
of attenuation arguments.  Attenuation comes in three types, which I 
identify and label for the first time: victim attenuation, wrongdoer 
attenuation, and act attenuation.  Victim attenuation is found in the 
argument that modern Blacks11 have no direct connection to slaves; 
wrongdoer attenuation, that modern Americans tend to lack specific 
individual connections to slave holders; and act attenuation, that 
modern injury to Blacks is unrelated to the harms of slavery.12
In every reparations discussion, the idea of attenuation — often 
inchoate, but always present — is a major barrier.  Reparations 
opponents use the different forms of attenuation in different ways.
And attenuation has important strategic effects. The problem of 
attenuation is a serious obstacle for reparations advocates because it 
threatens the progress of the litigation and legislation.13  To achieve 
10
 “The longer the interval between the protected activity and the adverse 
employment action, the more attenuated becomes the evidence of the requisite 
causation.”  Spadola v. New York City Transit Authority, 242 F. Supp. 2d 284, 294  
(S.D.N.Y. 2003); see generally 57A Am. Jur. 2d Negligence §§ 465, 491 (1989 & 
Supp. 2000) (discussing how temporal factor and an intervening circumstance affect 
remoteness and causation analysis).
11
 Throughout this Article I will use the term “Black” rather than “black” or 
“African-American.”  Cf. Kimberle W. Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: 
Transformation and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 Harv. L. Rev. 
1331, 1332 n.2 (1988) (“I shall use ‘‘African-American’ and ‘Black’ 
interchangeably.  When using ‘Black,’ I shall use an upper-case ‘B’ to reflect my 
view that Blacks, like Asians, Latinos, and other ‘minorities,’ constitute a specific 
cultural group and, as such, require denotation as a proper noun.”).
12
 See infra Part I.A. (discussing victim, wrongdoer, and act attenuation).
13 See infra Part I.A. (describing and analyzing various versions of attenuation); 
see also Eric J. Miller, Reconceiving Reparations:  Multiple Strategies in the 
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any success, reparationists must advance both legal and moral 
claims.14  Attenuation threatens both of these fronts.  
After defining and examining attenuation, I set out to address it.15
This is done in part by using tools developed in the mass tort context.  
This Article provides the tools to help reparations advocates approach 
attenuation.  Part I discusses and analyzes different types of 
attenuation arguments that arise in the reparations debate.  Part II 
discusses strategic consequences of attenuation and what reparations 
advocates must do to move past this obstacle.  Part III discusses how 
to incorporate ideas of causation from the mass tort context to address 
legal attenuation arguments.  The conclusion will review strategic 
considerations, and offers a few ideas for further addressing 
attenuation.
In the end, I seek to set out a framework for analyzing attenuation, 
and to work through some of the major legal attenuation problems.  
This Article will not address all possible attenuation concerns, but will 
address some major legal concerns, and will also set out a framework 
for analyzing and addressing other attenuation problems, giving 
Reparations Debate, 24 B.C. Third World L.J. 45, 52 (2003) (noting the problem of 
attenuation); Art Alcausin Hall, There is a Lot to be Repaired Before We Get to 
Reparations: A Critique of the Underlying Issues of Race That Impact the Fate of 
African American Reparations, 2 Scholar 1, 27-32 (2003) (noting recurrence of the 
attenuation defense); Eric Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Reparations for Slavery and 
Other Historical Injustices, 103 Colum. L. Rev. 689, 708 (2003) (noting difficulty in 
connecting past wrongs to present harm).
14 See infra Part II.A.
15
 This article will primarily address attenuation in reparation cases brought for 
the harm of slavery.  Other reparations cases, such as lawsuits brought for the Tulsa 
riots, present different questions of causation.  See Keith N. Hylton, A Framework 
for Reparations Claims, 24 B.C. Third World L.J. 31, 43 (2004) [hereinafter Hylton, 
Framework] (“When thinking about reparations claims, one should avoid the mistake 
of viewing them as monolithic, having the same difficulties in terms of identification 
of plaintiffs, causation, and prescription of legal rights. In fact, reparations claims 
vary along many legal dimensions, creating a rich array in terms of their consistency 
with settled law.”); see generally Alfred L. Brophy, Reconstructing the Dreamland: 
The Tulsa Riot of 1921 (2002) (giving background of Tulsa riots). 
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reparations advocates analytical tools for more effectively addressing 
other types of attenuation.16
I. Arguments About Reparations, Causation, and Attenuation
The first step in discussing attenuation is to examine the 
attenuation arguments that reparations opponents use.  As now 
constituted, the literature does not recognize the different arguments in 
play.  In this part I break down the attenuation arguments used by 
reparations opponents.  These include both moral and legal arguments.  
Much of this Part is descriptive, setting out various attenuation 
arguments as they have been used.  This Part is also classificatory, in 
16 A brief word is necessary on the tone of this Article.  The tone of an article 
typically reflects much of the author’s own worldview.  An article may be preaching 
to the choir, or it may seek a tone that is more appropriate for a broader audience.  
Article tone is particularly important within the reparations literature.  Reparations 
critics often frame their arguments in carefully neutral ways.  In contrast, many 
reparations advocates have employed a “within the movement” tone.  See also
Forde-Mazrui, supra note 8, at 689-90 (noting that “arguments advanced on both 
sides of this controversy often conflate concepts that should be kept distinct” and 
providing examples of this problem).  
The resulting differences in tone — compare critics like Posner and Vermeule, 
supra note 13, or Jeremy Waldron, Superceding Historic Injustice, 103 Ethics 4 
(1992), with advocates such as Robinson, supra note 1, or Matsuda, supra note 1 —
can create the harmful perception that reparations advocates are only speaking to the 
converted, and that neutral scholars are skeptical of the idea of reparations.  Cf.
Forde-Mazrui, supra note 8, at 689 (“Although much has been written on the subject, 
particularly in the context of affirmative action and reparations, the literature tends to 
be dominated by extreme positions incapable of taking competing claims 
seriously.”).  That perception, in turn, makes reparations arguments easier to 
marginalize or ignore.  Id. at 685 (“Although much has been written on the subject, 
the scholarship too often sheds more heat than light, and tends to be dominated by 
extreme positions incapable of taking opposing claims seriously.”).
This Article is intended to advance the idea of reparations.  However, 
throughout this Article — following the lead of some other recent articles by 
reparations advocates, see, e.g., Brophy, Some Problems, supra note 1, Forde-
Mazrui, supra note 8, I will employ a neutral tone.  This Article has at least two 
distinct audiences, reparations advocates and the general public.  In adopting a tone 
more suitable for a general audience, I hope to make my argument more effective.
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that it will place specific statements into one or more categories.  
Following that classification, this Part will review some counter-
arguments that reparations advocates have used.  By examining and 
classifying reparations arguments, this Part will give us the tools we 
need to discuss strategy, and how reparations advocates must deal with 
attenuation.  
Section A will briefly discuss causation and attenuation.  Section B 
will identify and define three types of attenuation that come up:  
Vic tim, wrongdoer, and act attenuation.  Section C will give examples 
of attenuation critiques, and section D will discuss responses that 
reparations advocates have offered.  Section E recaps.
A. But-For Cause, Proximate Cause, and Attenuation
Attenuation is a well-known theme in tort law.  Every first-year 
law student learns that a claimant must show causation in order to 
establish liability.17  And while any number of factors may be 
considered a “but-for” or “factual” cause of a harm,18 only some of 
those will be considered legally actionable — those which the law 
deems “proximate.”19  Attenuation is an attack on the move from but-
for to proximate cause.  Attenuation provides a distance between 
actors.  Courts may find that, because of attenuation, proximate cause 
17 See Keeton et al., supra note 8, at 263-67.
18
 Keeton et al., supra note 8, at 266 (“Many courts have devised a ruled, 
commonly known as the ‘but-for’ or ‘sine qua non’ rule, which may be stated as 
follows:  The defendant’s conduct is a cause of the event if the event would not have 
occurred but for that conduct; conversely, the defendant’s conduct is not a cause of 
the event, if the event would have occurred without it.”); Gray, supra note 8, at 90-
91 (discussing but-for cause).
19
 Keeton et al., supra note 8, at 263 (“An essential element of the plaintiff’s 
cause of action for negligence, of for that matter for any other tort, is that there be 
some reasonable connection between the act or omission of the defendant and the 
damages that the plaintiff has suffered.  This connection is usually dealt with by the 
courts in terms of what is called ‘proximate cause’ or ‘legal cause.’”); see also Gray, 
supra note 8, at 85-91 (discussing proximate and but-for cause); Calabresi, supra
note 7, at 72-76 (discussing this difference).
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is not established.20  Attenuation is thus a major theme in discussions 
of reparations.21
B. Types of Attenuation Arguments that Arise in Reparations
Slaves suffered many deprivations that could trigger tort liability.  
They routinely suffered physical injury, loss of property, lost wages, 
loss of liberty, loss of family relations, loss of consortium, and mental 
anguish.22  Their descendants suffer today from residual racism, a 
consequence of slavery.  It is clear that slavery was “[a] massive crime 
against humanity . . . an American holocaust”.23  The tort 
compensability of slavery is not negated by its legality at the time.24
20 See id. at 264; Gray, supra note 8, at 86-91.
21 See, e.g., Bittker, supra note 1, at 9; Brophy, Some Problems, supra note 1, at 
518-19.  Attenuation not a special or uniquely high hurdle to forestall reparations 
claims, though they may be unusually susceptible to this defense.  Posner & 
Vermeule, supra note 13, at 711.  Attenuation is a familiar bugbear for civil rights 
advocates.  See Maria L. Marcus, Learning Together: Justice Marshall’s 
Desegregation Opinions, 61 Fordham L. Rev. 69, 90-95 (1992) (noting Supreme 
Court use of attenuation to rule against desegregation claims).
There is certainly no agreement by reparations advocates that proximate cause 
is not satisfied. Brophy, Some Problems, supra note 1, at 123-25; Forde-Mazrui, 
supra note 8, at 728-33 (arguing that chain of proximate causation has not been 
broken by actions of slave descendants).
22 See Keith N. Hylton, Slavery and Tort Law 4-34 (Boston Univ. Sch. of Law, 
Working Paper No. 03–02, 2003 Soc. Science Research Network Elec. Paper 
Collection), at http:// www.bu.edu/law/faculty/papers/pdf_files/HyltonK012803.pdf
[hereinafter Hylton, Slavery] (discussing different torts which arise from slavery).
23
 Robinson, supra note 1, at 33; see also Kevin Hopkins, Forgive U.S. Our 
Debts?, Righting the Wrongs of Slavery, 89 Geo. L.J. 2531, 2534 (2001) (“The 
wrongs done to African slaves during slavery, such as the physical capture and 
exploitation of Africans for labor, the inhumane treatment and abuse of slaves by 
white slaveholders, and the psychological abuses in failing to acknowledge and 
respect African personhood, to name only a few, were horrible and unfathomable.”).
24 Tort law routinely compensates victims of harm cause by acts which were 
legal when performed, such as use of asbestos or Agent Orange, or provision of 
tobacco or DES.
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The tort case for slave reparations is strong, but is subject to defenses 
of attenuation.
Attenuation arguments often come disguised or combined with 
other arguments.  Attenuation arguments in the reparations context 
have three major thematic strands.  These are victim attenuation, 
wrongdoer attenuation, and act attenuation.  These correspond to a 
perceived lack of connection between deceased slaves and present 
claimants (victim attenuation); between slave beneficiaries (slave 
holders and governments) and modern citizens or governments 
(wrongdoer attenuation); and between harmful acts of slavery and any 
present injury.25  They are interrelated but distinct components of the 
broader attenuation argument.  
25
 Some other writers have noted the presence of some of these general themes 
in reparations.  See Brophy, Some Problems, supra note 1, at 505 (“There are, then, 
several distinct problems between connecting past and present. There are problems 
in connecting the past wrongdoers with their successors (who would be the present 
defendants); problems in connecting past victims with their successors (who would 
be the present plaintiffs); and connections between past wrongs and present 
claims.”); see also id. at 503-04 (“The claims are hard to fit into a traditional 
framework for two reasons. First, the victims are making claims against people who 
are not themselves wrongdoers. Furthermore, that defendant class may not have any 
current benefit from the harm. In that case, there will be a claim asserted against a 
discrete group of innocent people. . . . Often the perpetrators cannot be identified 
with specificity or are no longer alive.”); Alfreda Robinson, Corporate Social 
Responsibility and African American Reparations: Jubilee, 55 Rutgers L. Rev. 309, 
365 (2003) (noting that opponents of reparations focus on specific difficulties 
including “the absence of directly harmed individuals,” “the absence of individual 
perpetrators,” and “the lack of direct causation”); Posner & Vermeule, supra note 13, 
at 698 (“Reparations claims thus involve three relationships: (1) the relationship 
between the original wrongdoer and the original victim; (2) the relationship between 
the original wrongdoer and the possible payer of reparations; and (3) the relationship 
between the original victim and the possible claimant or beneficiary of reparations. 
The claimant must show that each relationship is of the proper type.”); id. at 699 
(“Compensatory justice requires a relationship of identity between the wrongdoer 
and payer and a relationship of identity between the victim and claimant.”); Verdun, 
supra note 2, at 628-30 (“Opponents of reparations to African Americans argue that 
living whites have not injured living African Americans; the wrongs of slavery were 
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The first concern, victim attenuation, is that Blacks today are not 
sufficiently linked to slaves, and are thus undeserving of any 
recompense for slavery.26  The basic idea underlying this concern is 
intuitive.  Blacks living today were not directly subject to the harms of 
slavery.27  Many Blacks may be slave descendants, but many others 
are more recent arrivals who lack that connection as well.28  This lack 
of connection creates victim attenuation.  Victim attenuation is a 
problem that is unique to intergenerational claims, where the claimant
is not the same person as an original victim.29 Since the present 
claimant is not an original victim, and may have a relatively low 
proportion of descent, she may be subject to victim attenuation 
committed by individuals who have been dead for years.  African Americans to day 
were never slaves, and are not entitled to wages for slave labor performed over one 
hundred years ago.”); Hylton, Framework, supra note 15, at 39-40 (discussing 
different types of claims and distinguishing them based on whether injurers and 
victims are identifiable).
Surprisingly, none of the existing scholarship discusses the significance, of 
these different variants of attenuation.  Nor does it classify and analyze these 
divisions, as I do in this Article.
26
 A related concern is that slave descendants today would not exist but for 
slavery, and therefore are not entitled to recompense.  See, e.g., Stephen Kershnar, 
The Inheritance-Based Claim to Reparations, 8 Legal Theory 243, 247- 51 (2002).
27
 “Opponents also argue that African Americans today were never slaves and 
did not directly experience the injustices of slavery and its effects and thus are not 
entitled to any form of reparations.” Hall, supra note 13, at 30; see also Brophy, 
Some Problems, supra note 1, at 518-20; Miller, supra note 13, at 52; David 
Horowitz, Ten Reasons Why Reparations for Blacks is a Bad Idea for Blacks - and 
Racist Too, Front Page Magazine, January 3, 2001.
28 See Brophy, Some Problems, supra note 1, at 519; Posner & Vermeule, 
supra note 13, at 739; Graham Hughes, Reparations for Blacks?, 43 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 
1063, 1064 (1968) (noting difficulties in identifying plaintiffs); see also Linda 
Chavez, Promoting Racial Harmony, in The Affirmative Action Debate 314, 314-22 
(George E. Curry ed., 1996) (noting victim attenuation concerns relating to 
affirmative action); Verdun, supra note 2, at 623 (discussing victim attenuation in 
affirmative action); Posner & Vermeule, supra note 13, at 712 (same).
29
 As such, victim attenuation arguments are limited to instances such as Black 
reparations, Native American reparations, and similar intergenerational justice cases. 
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arguments.  Victim attenuation can be presented as a demand for 
statistics.  There is no reason that modern Blacks should be connected 
to slaves, this argument goes.
The second type of attenuation is wrongdoer attenuation.  
Wrongdoer attenuation exists because present-day citizens and 
governments do not seem to be closely connected to slave owners, 
suggesting that perhaps they should be required to pay for harms 
caused by slavery.30  Many modern non-Blacks are not descendants of 
slave owners, and have no apparent direct connections to them.31  All 
30 See Brophy, Some Problems, supra note 1, at 519 (“The people who 
perpetrated the crimes of slavery are gone and their estates are (mostly) distributed. 
A few corporations survive and some of the money made from slavery is traceable to 
currently existing bank accounts.  However, there are significant problems in 
imposing the liability of past generations of private actors on the current 
generation.”); see also Matsuda, supra note 1, at 375 (“Of those taxpayers who must 
pay the reparations, some are direct descendants of perpetrators while others are 
merely guilty by association. Under a reparations doctrine, the working class whites 
whose ancestors never harbored any prejudice or ill-will toward the victim group are 
taxed equally with the perpetrators’ direct descendants for the sins of the past.”); 
Posner & Vermeule, supra note 13, at 736 (“Reparations are rarely paid by the 
original wrongdoers, that is, the individuals who performed the wrongful acts, 
whether or not on behalf of a state or corporate body. Substantive moral 
considerations must explain why nonwrongdoers—usually taxpayers or 
shareholders—should pay reparations; when these considerations fail, prudential 
considerations must be invoked.”); Hall, supra note 13, at 30 (“White America today 
attempts to distance itself from both the ‘sins of slavery’ and of its forefathers, in an 
effort to deny responsibility for the past and present problems associated with race.  
Opponents of African American reparations contend that slavery and past injustices 
by White Americans were not conducted by individuals living today, but rather by 
individuals long dead.”).
31
 This is recognized in the reparations literature.  See, e.g., Brophy, Some 
Problems, supra note 1, at 519; Verdun, supra note 2, at 629-30; Miller, supra note 
13, at 52. And many modern Americans may not feel any sort of link to slave 
owners.  However, based on casual observation, there seems to be at least some 
degree of connection that many white southerners feel for former slaveholders.  This 
can be seen, for instance, in the detailed civil war role-playing activities; the 
contin ued prevalence of statues of confederate generals; the politically popular use of 
the confederate flag; and the resurgence of historical societies such as the Daughters 
CAUSATION AND ATTENUATION
13
living citizens are a generation or more removed from slave owners.  
In addition, many slave owner descendants are partial descendants 
only — or even mixed descendants, with ancestry traceable both to 
slaves and to slave owners.32  Vincene Verdun sums up the concepts 
underlying wrongdoer attenuation as follows:
From the dominant perspective, it would be patently 
unfair to make all white people or society pay for 
slavery because that would necessarily include people 
who did not participate in the wrong. These people 
include whites who are descendants of abolitionists and 
nonslaveholders, and immigrants, or descendants of 
immigrants, who came to this country after slavery was 
abolished; post slavery immigrants cannot be connected 
with a wrong associated with slavery.33
of the Confederacy.  Reparations opponents may be more connected to the past, and 
in particular to the slave-owning past, than they tend to admit in discussions about 
liability.  See Jason Zengerle, Lost Cause, The New Republic, August 2, 2004, at 14 
(discussing popularity of Confederate reenactment and historical groups); see also
Carter Davis, Race and Reparations, Alabama City magazine, April 24, 2004, 
available online at 
http://www.al.com/news/citymagazine/index.ssf?/base/news/1082801701197890.xm
l, at 5 (noting concerns raised by opponents about the “legacy” of the University of 
Alabama when professor Al Brophy suggested the university investigate its slave 
owning past).
32 See Posner & Vermeule, supra note 13, at 740 (“The more difficult problem 
exists when the wrongdoing occurs on a large scale, and the wrongdoers and victims 
miscegenate, or their descendants miscegenate. A descendant of a victim might 
therefore also be the descendant of a wrongdoer.  With sufficient mixing, reparations 
become pointless. It makes no sense for a person to pay reparations from one pocket 
to the other. Even with more limited mixing, one must grapple with the question 
whether to treat people differently on the basis of how many ancestors belong to the 
class of victims and how many belong to the class of wrongdoers.”).
33
 Verdun, supra note 2, at 630; see also The Conversation, Wash. Post, July 
23, 2000, at F1 (“As a white woman, I am tired of being blamed for slavery 
because—and only because—I am white, when the fact of the matter is I am 
descended from Irish and German immigrants who didn’t arrive on Ellis Island until 
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Wrongdoer attenuation is a concern because reparations is often 
presented as a demand for justice.34  The criticism may be presented 
through statistics, such as noting the number of people who have 
arrived in the country since 1865, the percent of the populace 
descendant from post-bellum immigrants, and so forth.35  While victim 
attenuation may evoke the possibility of an unjustified windfall, 
wrongdoer attenuation brings the image of an unjustified penalty.36
That is a strongly negative image to overcome in a society which 
places high value, at least rhetorically, on the protection of the 
innocent.37  As Posner and Vermeule note, “a strong tradition in the 
United States holds that individuals are not blameworthy for acts over 
which they have no control.”38
well after the Civil War.”) (statement of Peggy Sakagawa); Massey, supra note 9, at 
162.
34
 Reparations advocates may be inadvertently encouraging this critique, by the 
use of the language of culpability in reparations literature.  See Miller, supra note 13, 
at 49-52 (arguing that reparations advocates have created problems by being 
unnecessarily confrontational); see also Brophy, Some Problems, supra note 1, at 
519 n.94 (“My point is that in talking about reparations for slavery and Jim Crow, 
one must be careful in talking about claims of victims against perpetrators, when 
many of the people against whom claims are being asserted are not perpetrators.”); 
Alfred Brophy, Taking Reparations Seriously, (Unpublished Manuscript), at 16 
(“For many reparationists, the focus is upon past harm as a way of arguing for 
reparations.  Among others there seems to be little interest in reconciliation.  But 
those voices are not the leaders in the field.  They do not represent the most 
thoughtful reparationists.”).  See generally Lee A. Harris, Political Autonomy as a 
Form of Reparations, 29 Southern L. Rev. 25 (2001); Lee A. Harris, “Reparations” 
as a Dirty Word: The Norm Against Slavery Reparations, 33 U. Memphis L. Rev. 
409 (2003).
35 See Horowitz, supra note 27, at 3-4.
36 See Waldron, supra note 16, at 26-27 (noting these concerns).  In addition, 
reparations opponents sometimes suggest that past acts, such as the civil war, 
constitute sufficient payments for slavery.  See, e.g., Posner & Vermeule, supra note 
13, at 730-31 (noting this argument); Horowitz, supra note 27, at 9.
37
 Verdun, supra note 2, at 620-22.
38
 Posner & Vermeule, supra note 13, at 699; Daryl Levinson, Collective 
Sanctions, 56 Stan. L. Rev. 345, 347-48 (2003).  In instances where group sanctions 
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Finally, the third prong of attenuation — act attenuation — is that 
there is no direct connection between past wrongdoing and present 
harm.  One critic notes, “another problematic consideration is 
causation, which invokes the question of whether the injury presently 
complained of was a foreseeable product of the defendant’s conduct. . . 
. it is necessary to wrestle with the issue of whether that past conduct 
has caused injury to a contemporary plaintiff.”39 This objection is also 
easy to understand.  It can be difficult, after all, to connect the harms 
of slavery to specific disadvantages of Blacks today.  Indeed, it is not 
easy to characterize Blacks as a cohesive economic group at all.  There 
are vast differences in wealth, status, and class among individual 
Blacks.40  Some individuals appear to have integrated smoothly into 
society, while others have not.41  The difficulty of unraveling potential 
contributing (or ameliorating) causes leads to act attenuation.  
Act attenuation is important because the legal system generally 
requires that victims and wrongdoers establish a direct connection 
between a wrongful act and a claimant’s injury.42  Attenuation is a 
are tolerated, it is often as a form of deterrence, see id. at 348-49, and such 
consequentialist justification would not apply to the case of reparations for slavery.  
See Massey, supra note 9, at 165 (noting that reparations have no deterrent value); 
see also Levinson, supra, at 347-48 (noting that Blacks have been subjected to 
collective sanctions in the past).
39
 Massey, supra note 9, at 162-63.
40
 Matsuda, supra note 1, at 375.  Of course, despite these differences, Blacks 
are overwhelmingly less well-off than whites.  See generally Robert Westley, Many 
Billions Gone, Is it Time to Reconsider the Case for Black Reparations?, 40 B.C. L. 
Rev. 429, 471-72 (1998) (same).  
41
 As Mari Matsuda notes, “Not all members of the victim group are similarly 
situated. Some are rich, some poor. Some feel betrayed, others do not. Some are 
easily identifiable as group members, others have weak claims to membership.”  
Matsuda, supra note 1, at 375.
42 See id. at 380-81 (“The linkage of victims and perpetrators for acts occurring 
in the immediate past is another trait of standard legal claims.”); see also Brophy, 
Some Problems, supra note 1, at 505 (“Closely related to the difficulty of
identification of victims and wrongdoers is the requirement that there be a close 
connection between past wrong and present claim.”); Verdun, supra note 2, at 624 
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factor in standing inquiry.  The Supreme Court notes that a relevant 
question in deciding standing is, “Is the line of causation between the 
illegal conduct and injury too attenuated?”43  As a challenge to the 
connection between an initial act and a harm, act attenuation may be 
viewed as an attack on the very idea of statistical proof.  As Al Brophy 
writes, “[f]ormulating a legal claim requires linking past perpetrators 
with people who currently exist. It also involves linking past victims 
with people who are making a claim in the present—or what one might 
call present victims of past discrimination.”44 The difference between 
victim and act attenuation is subtle.  While victim attenuation says 
“you are not a person who may bring a claim,” act attenuation says, 
“you have not suffered any harm.”  When combined with the doctrine 
of standing, act attenuation—“you have not suffered any harm” — can 
lead to victim attenuation—“you are not a person who may bring a 
claim.”
These three types of attenuation are used, often together, to suggest 
that reparations for slavery would not be appropriate.  These critiques 
are not unique to the case of Black slavery, and can potentially apply 
in most or all reparations-type actions.45
C. Examples of the Attenuation Critique
The problem of attenuation arises in three major areas: the 
legislature, the courts, and the media and popular opinion.  Each of 
these areas is affected differently by attenuation arguments.
1. Legislature
The effect of attenuation arguments in the legislature is to 
undermine the legitimacy of proposed reparations legislation.  In 
(noting this requirement in affirmative action).  This is a common theme in tort law.  
See, e.g., F.R.C.P. 23 (setting out commonality requirement in class action lawsuits).
43
 Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 757-58 (1984) (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 
U.S. 490, 504 (1975).
44
 Brophy, Some Problems, supra note 1, at 504.
45 See Matsuda, supra note 1, at 372 (discussing attenuation defense in 
connection with reparations claims by Native Hawaiians); see also Posner & 
Vermeule, supra note 13, at 699-711 (noting these types of objections to reparations 
generally).
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particular, wrongdoer attenuation comes into play.  Representative 
Henry Hyde, then-chair of the House Judiciary Committee, argued that 
“the notion of collective guilt for what people did [200-plus] years 
ago, that this generation should pay a debt for that generation, is an 
idea whose time has gone.  I never owned a slave.  I never oppressed 
anybody.  I don’t know that I should have to pay for someone who did 
[own slaves] generations before I was born.”46  These sorts of 
attenuation arguments are often both moral and political.47
2.  Courts
The attenuation problem also appears in court cases, generally as 
part of the analysis of standing, where victim attenuation is raised.  
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, in Cato v. United States, 
dismissed reparations claims brought against the government, stating 
that:
Cato proceeds on a generalized, class-based grievance; 
she neither alleges, nor suggests that she might claim, 
any conduct on the part of any specific official or as a 
result of any specific program that has run afoul of a 
constitutional or statutory right and caused her a 
discrete injury.  Without a concrete, personal injury that 
is not abstract and that is fairly traceable to the 
government conduct that she challenges as 
unconstitutional, Cato lacks standing.48
46 See Merida, supra note 2, at C-01; see also 136 Cong. Rec. S1312-03, 
Statement of Sen. Bumpers (Feb. 21, 1990) (stating that “ I am a son of the South. 
But I never owned a slave. My father never owned a slave” in arguing that modern 
Turkey should not be blamed for the Armenian genocide).   
47 See Eric Yamamoto, Racial Reparations: Japanese American Redress and 
African American Claims, 40 B.C. L. Rev. 477, 496-97 (1998) (discussing political 
component of reparations arguments).
48
 70 F.3d at 1109-110. The court elaborated, “she does not trace the presence 
of discrimination and its harm to the United States rather than to other persons or 
institutions. Accordingly, Cato lacks standing to bring a suit setting forth the claims 
she suggests.”  Id.
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Similarly, the district court in the In re African-American Slave 
Descendants Litigation dismissed a number of consolidated claims in 
related cases brought against corporations.49  That consolidated case 
proceeded under a different theory than Cato; it was brought not 
against the government but against corporations whose predecessor 
entities had benefited from slavery.  Despite this difference, the issue 
of standing again proved decisive.50  The court wrote that:
Plaintiffs’ alleged injury is derivative of the injury 
inflicted upon enslaved African-Americans over a 
century ago. This is insufficient to establish standing, 
and contrary to centuries of well-settled legal principles 
requiring that a litigant demonstrate a personal stake in 
an alleged dispute. . . . Plaintiffs cannot establish a 
personal injury sufficient to confer standing by merely 
alleging some genealogical relationship to African-
Americans held in slavery over one- hundred, two-
hundred, or three-hundred years ago.51
Plaintiffs had sought to establish standing by arguing that they 
were slave descendants, and claiming that, as the rightful heirs of their 
ancestors’ assets, they suffered injury because their ancestors were not 
compensated for their labor.52  The court disagreed:  “Plaintiffs’ claim 
to the economic wealth of their ancestors’ labor is conjectural. While 
most would like to assume that they will be the beneficiaries of their 
ancestors’ wealth upon their demise, this is a mere assumption.”53  In 
addition, the court ruled that the plaintiffs did not meet the 
49
 In re African-American Slave Descendants Litigation, 304 F. Supp. 2d 1027 
(N.D. Ill. 2004).
50
 The case was dismissed in part because of standing and attenuation issues,
and in part because of the statute of limitations.  See id at 1065-75 (discussing 
statutes of limitation); id. at 1070-75 (discussing exceptions to the statute of 
limitations); see generally Robinson, supra note 25, at 366-68 (discussing statutes of 
limitations); Wenger, supra note 1, at 244-48 (same).
51
 Id. at 1047, 1051.
52 Id. at 1048.
53
 Id. at 1048.
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requirements for third party standing: “Plaintiffs have not alleged a 
legally sufficient relation to their ancestors. All that Plaintiffs allege is 
a genealogical relationship, and more is required under the law in 
order to confer third-party standing.”54
These conclusions show the difficulty courts have in dealing with 
attenuation.  The Slave Descendants court based parts of its opinion on 
all three types of attenuation.   It mentioned wrongdoer attenuation —
“the allegations of Plaintiff’s Complaint do not link these Defendants
to the alleged harm”55 — and act attenuation — “Plaintiffs’ complaint 
is devoid of any allegations that any specific conduct of the 
Defendants was a cause of the continuing injuries of which Plaintiffs 
complain.”56  In particular, the Slave Descendants court, like the Cato
court, focused on victim attenuation — “Plaintiffs cannot establish a 
personal injury sufficient to confer standing”.57
Thus, the problems of victim, wrongdoer, and act attenuation 
certainly have been decisive in reparations suits in the courts.58
54
 Id. at 1053.  As the court noted, the requirement is that the party asserting 
third party standing show some injury in fact, and that that party also show that 
prudential considerations weigh in its favor.  Id. at 1052-53.
55
 Id. at 1048 (emphasis added).  The Court also wrote that the “Complaint is 
devoid of any allegations that connect the specifically named Defendants or their 
predecessors and any of the Plaintiffs or their ancestors,” wrote the court. Id. at 1041.
56 Id. at 1049-50.
57 Id. at 1051; see id. at 1048; see also id. at 1064 (“Plaintiffs’ Complaint fails 
to connect any alleged injury of any one of the Plaintiffs or their ancestors to alleged 
conduct by any one of the Defendants or their predecessors. . . . [T]he allegations in 
a complaint must be those relating to the plaintiff, not those of someone else.”).
58
 Other reparations cases in the courts have largely followed the reasoning of 
Cato without further discussion.  See Bell v. United States, No. Civ. A. 
301CV0338D, 2001 WL 1041792, at *2 (N.D.Tex. Aug.31, 2001) (citing Cato in 
holding that plaintiff lacked standing); Bey v. United States Department of Justice, 
No. 95 CIV 10401, 1996 WL 413684, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. July 24, 1996) (same); 
Langley v. United States, No. C 95-4227, 1995 WL 714378, at *2 (N.D.Cal. Nov.30, 
1995) (same); see also Himiya v. United States, No. 94 C 4065, 1994 WL 376850, 
*2 (N.D.Ill. July 15, 1994) (citing Cato in dismissing on sovereign immunity 
grounds).
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3.  Media and Literature
Every type of attenuation has been discussed in the media.  The 
idea of wrongdoer attenuation has been raised by many prominent 
critics of reparations.  For example, Armstrong Williams criticizes the 
reparations movement for “seek[ing] to penalize our current 
government for what white slave holders did centuries ago.”59  John 
McWhorter argues that some “obvious retorts” to the idea of 
reparations include “that many whites in America today arrived after 
emancipation [and] that many whites owned no slaves.”60  David 
Horowitz has stated that reparations are inappropriate because “only a 
tiny minority of white Americans ever owned slaves” and “most 
[modern] Americans have no connection (direct or indirect) to 
slavery,” among other reasons.61  Michelle Malkin writes that 
reparations advocates seek payments from “the U.S. government, 
which means American taxpayers, which means tens of millions of 
people who had nothing remotely whatsoever to do with inflicting 
such injustice on anyone.”62  And other critics of reparations have 
voiced similar opinions.63
59
 Armstrong Williams, Presumed Victims, in Should America Pay?, supra note 
1, at 165, 167; see also id. at 170 (noting conceptual difficulty in assessing 
reparations against post-bellum immigrants)
60
 John McWhorter, Against Reparations, in Should America Pay?, supra note 
1, at 191.
61
  Horowitz, supra note 27, at 1.  This article was widely distributed and
received nationwide attention.  See Brophy, Cultural War, supra note 3, at 1201.
62
 Michelle Malkin, Get Out Your Reparations Calculator, TownHall.com, 
August 15, 2002, available online at 
http://www.townhall.com/columnists/michellemalkin/mm20020815.shtml .
63 See, e.g., CNN, Crossfire, August 20, 2002, available online at 
http://www.cnn.com/2002/ALLPOLITICS/08/20/cf.crossfire/index.html (statement 
of Tucker Carlson) (“You are not responsible for what your ancestors did. Given 
that, isn’t it against the idea of justice in this country, maybe even immoral, to take 
money from people as punishment for a deed they didn’t commit?”); Jonah 
Goldberg, National Review, March 19, 2001 (“Most of ‘white’ America — which 
includes many Hispanics — does not consist of the descendents of slave owners or 
even beneficiaries of slavery.  The folks from my father’s side of the family, for 
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Other, less oppositional voices have also wondered about these 
concerns. Kevin Merida, a relatively sympathetic Washington Post 
reporter, frames the potential issue as:  
Why should American taxpayers who never owned 
slaves pay for the sins of ancestors they don’t even 
know? And what about those whose ancestors arrived 
here long after slavery ended?”64
Media and literature critics of reparations also emphasize victim 
attenuation.  For example, one critic argues that “it is obscene to think 
of this modern generation of black Americans profiting from the blood 
money drawn nearly 140 years ago from the exploitation of slaves.”65
Merida notes that “Opponents say there is no precedent for paying 
people who are dead, that reparations are usually awarded to 
survivors.”66  Stephen Kershnar argues that modern Blacks have only 
“token” rights of reparations because they are not sufficiently 
connected to slaves.67  And Keith Hylton has argued that reparations 
claims must be treated as derivative claims under tort law, which 
means that as a practical matter they will fail.68
Similarly, media and pundit statements discuss act attenuation.  
Horowitz writes that reparations is “based on the unfounded claim that 
all African-American descendants of slaves suffer from the economic 
example, didn’t arrive in the country until the Civil War — and they showed up 
poor. My mom’s family is from Boston. So I don’t feel any particular ancestral guilt. 
. . . And remember, 14% of Americans today are either immigrants or the children of 
immigrants. That’s a lot of newcomers to blame for something done by old-timers.”).
64
 Merida, supra note 2, at C-01.
65
 Juan Williams, Slavery Isn’t the Issue, Wall Street Journal, April 14, 2002.  
See also Adolph Reed, On Reparations, The Progressive, December 2000 (noting 
difficulty of connecting modern victims with slave ancestors); Merida, supra note 2, 
at C-01.
66
 Merida, supra note 2, at C-01.
67
 Kershnar, supra note 26, at 251-58; see also Janna Thompson, Historical 
Injustice and Reparation:  Justifying Claims of Descendants, 112 Ethics 114, 116-21 
(2001) (suggesting that the passage of time precludes reparations).
68
 Hylton, Slavery, supra note 22, at 38-45.
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consequences of slavery and discrimination” and that “no evidence-
based attempt has been made to prove that living individuals have 
been adversely affected by a slave system that was ended over 150 
years ago.”69  A number of critics suggest that shortcomings of Blacks, 
individually or as a group, are responsible for any present injury.70  A 
“lack of sufficient connection between past wrong and present claim” 
is an argument that Matsuda calls one of the “standard doctrinal 
objections to reparations.”71
D. Responses by Reparations Advocates
Reparations advocates understand that attenuation is a serious 
concern.  They have suggested various defenses to the attenuation 
critiques.  These include the idea of group harm and group benefit, a 
focus on corporate identity (either of corporations or of the nation as a 
whole), and fairness and equity concerns.  For the reasons set out 
below, none of the current responses has fully succeeded in addressing 
the attenuation problem.72
69
 Horowitz, supra note 27, at 6.
70 See Forde-Mazrui, supra note 8, at 728-33 (discussing these arguments); see 
also Hylton, Framework, supra note  15, at 35-37 (discussing differences in Black 
and white family structure).
71
 Matsuda, supra note 1, at 373-74.  Matsuda’s other standard objections are 
“factual objections and excuse or justification for illegal acts; difficult identification 
of perpetrator and victim groups; [and] difficulty of calculation of damages.”  Id.; 
see also id. at 374 (“The problem of specific identification of wrongdoers and 
victims is a common objection to reparations.”).
72
 Other strategic moves by reparations advocates have not affected the 
attenuation issue.  For example, some advocates have suggested bringing claims 
under a theory of unjust enrichment.  Unjust enrichment is perceived to have certain 
advantages, such as possible advantages in dealing with statutes of limitation. See
Anthony Sebok, Reparations, Unjust Enrichment, and the Importance of Knowing 
the Difference Between the Two, 58 NYU Ann. Surv. Am. L. 651, 653 (2003).  It 
was a legal theory that was successfully employed in the Holocaust litigation. See
id.; see also Anthony Sebok, Prosaic Justice, 2002 Legal Aff. 51, 52.  This approach 
offers some benefits with regard to attenuation as well; it depends only on a showing 
that a payer was unjustly enriched, and so it may lessen the difficulty of overcoming 
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1.  Group Harm and Group Benefit
One response to attenuation concerns, articulated by advocates 
such as Mari Matsuda, has been to argue that reparations should be 
based on an idea of group harm and group benefit.73 Thus, addressing 
ideas of wrongdoer attenuation, Matsuda writes:
A horizontal connection exists as well within the 
perpetrator group. Members of the dominant class 
continue to benefit from the wrongs of the past and the 
presumptions of inferiority imposed upon victims. They 
may decry this legacy, and harbor no racist thoughts of 
their own, but they cannot avoid their privileged 
status.74
This group benefit approach has also been advocated by other 
reparations advocates.  Christopher Hitchens notes that slaves 
benefited even non-slaveholders, while immigrants benefited from the 
legacy of slavery.75
Similarly, Matsuda addresses victim attenuation through the idea 
of group harm.  “The continuing group damage engendered by past 
wrongs ties victim group members together, satisfying the horizontal
unity sought by the legal mind,” writes Matsuda.76  Among the group 
act attenuation.  However, unjust enrichment has serious drawbacks.  It is uniquely 
susceptible to equitable defenses. Sebok, supra, at 655.  It also may be a less morally 
compelling argument. Id. at 657; Sebok, supra, at 52-53.  In addition, the Slave 
Descendants court rejected unjust enrichment claims, along with other claims. See In 
re African-American Slave Descendants Litigation, 304 F. Supp. 2d 1027, 1068, 
1075-76 (N.D. Ill. 2004).
73
 Matsuda, supra note 1, at 377. Matsuda labels her approach “looking to the 
bottom.”  Id.
74
 Id. at 377-379.  
75
 Christopher Hitchens, Debt of Honor, in Should America Pay?, supra note 1, 
at 172, 176-77.
76 Matsuda, supra note 1, at 377.
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harms cited are racism, stereotyping, demographic disadvantages, and 
physical attacks on group members.77
Thus, group harm addresses victim attenuation, while group 
benefit addresses wrongdoer attenuation.78  Both victim and 
wrongdoer can have acts ascribed to them based on their membership 
in the group.  
However, group harm and benefit are of limited utility precisely
because they do not fit within the existing tort paradigm.  They are
thus easy for courts and critics to reject outright.  As one critic notes, 
“many advocates of reparations enthusiastically embrace the notion of 
collective rights and collective liability, but they have the burden of 
proving why it is that we should displace our fundamental notions of 
individual rights and responsibilities with a collectivist version of 
rights and responsibilities.”79  Because group harm and benefits 
arguments fail to address critics on their own terms, they are not an 
effective response to legal attenuation arguments.80 To the extent that 
77 Id.
78 Cf. Posner & Vermeule, supra note 13, at 699 (“If the wrongdoer and victim 
must be individuals—the premise of ethical individualism—then compensatory 
justice will rarely justify a reparations scheme. The reason is that as we define 
reparations either the wrongdoer-payer or the victim-claimant relationship must not 
be one of identity. But if the wrongdoer and victim can be groups, then payers or 
claimants will sometimes be individuals who are not the original wrongdoers or 
victims—rather, they derive their rights or obligations from their membership in the
group.”).
79
 Massey, supra note 9, at 166.
80
 Matsuda, supra note 1, at 380-88; Hylton, Slavery, supra note 22, at 47-48 
(stating that any legal decision is likely to follow current tort law doctrines); Posner 
& Vermeule, supra note 13, at 715-21; see also Brophy, Some Problems, supra note 
1, at 519 (noting “some problems” with the group harm formulation).  
In addition, group harm and benefit arguments create some special problems.  
In particular, under current constitutional jurisprudence, a reparations scheme based 
on group harm might be likely to be invalidated as unconstitutional.  “Nonblacks 
may sue to enjoin the program on the straightforward claim that they suffer both 
economic and stigmatic injuries by virtue of the government’s provision of a race-
based benefit.”  Posner & Vermeule, supra note 13, at 716; see also Brophy, Some 
Problems, supra note 1, at 529 (noting that in cases seeking a remedy based on racial 
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they are accepted at all, they will be viewed as a moral response, while 
the major victim attenuation problem is a legal obstacle.
2.  Corporate Identity
A second response has been to argue that corporations, due to their 
legal nature, are still the same entities that oppressed the slaves.  
Alfreda Robinson has made this argument.  She notes that:
The corporate benefits derived from Forced Labor were 
undoubtedly a substantial factor in the success of these 
companies.  Accordingly, these present day companies 
continue to be unjustly enriched as a result of the past. 
Private inheritances linked to the wealth of these 
companies also unjustly obtained the benefits of these 
Americans who were forced to labor under slave 
conditions for no reason.81
This approach solves the problem of wrongdoer attenuation.  The 
corporations cannot claim that they are not the same as the wrongdoer 
entity.  However, this approach does little to remedy victim or act 
attenuation.  Such a strategy has been used by reparations advocates, 
classification “the court wants a close connection between the past discrimination 
and the remedy being sought . . . the court seems unwilling—or at least reluctant—to 
look further into the past”); Posner & Vermeule, supra note 13, at 712-14 (noting 
current legal requirements for affirmative action programs).  But cf. id. at 720 (“If 
affirmative action can ever survive the narrow tailoring inquiry, reparations should 
survive a fortiori.”).
81
 Robinson, supra note 25, at 358-61.  As Robinson notes, “successor 
corporations are liable for the debts of the predecessor corporations” where certain 
conditions are met. Id.; see also id. at 369 (“In the case of Corporate Reparations, 
there are very likely direct victims or heirs of the same who can demonstrate specific 
injury by a specific corporation.  Accordingly, the standing doctrine is not an 
impossible legal obstacle in the Corporate Reparations context.”).  On jurors’ 
willingness to assess damages against corporations, see generally David A. Hoffman 
& Michael P. O’Shea, Can Law and Economics Be Both Practical and Principled?, 
53 Ala. L. Rev. 335, 395-98 (2002).
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such as in the Slave Descendants litigation.82 But the suit was 
dismissed, precisely because it could not overcome the hurdles of 
victim and act attenuation.83  This approach is also open to the 
criticism that it is arbi trary.84
In addition, this response is a legal maneuver to address what is at 
root a moral concern.  While legal requirements may be satisfied by 
finding payers with long legal lives, who owned slaves in their past, 
popular opinion will still demand a moral answer for the question of 
why a corporation’s shareholders, or a government’s citizens, are 
ultimately paying for harms that they are generations removed from.
A related argument is that the country as a whole, with its 
corporate identity, is liable for the harms caused by slavery.85  Robert 
Fullinwider argues that “the real issues are corporate responsibility-the 
responsibility of the nation as a whole-and civic responsibility-the 
responsibility of each citizen to do his fair part in honoring the nation’s 
obligations.”86  Kim Forde-Mazrui writes in a similar vein, “America 
as a nation was responsible for protecting slavery and discrimination, a 
responsibility that belongs to the nation as a nation and therefore 
continues over time despite changeover in the American citizenry.”87
82 See Complaint and Jury Trial Demand, Farmer-Paellmann et al. v. 
FleetBoston et al., No. CV-02-1862 (E.D.N.Y., Complaint filed Mar. 26, 2002) 
(available online at http://www.nyed.uscourts.gov/02cv1862cmp.pdf) (seeking 
reparations from corporations which benefited from slavery).
83 See supra notes 49-57 and accompanying text.
84 See Hylton, Framework, supra note  15, at 37-38 (arguing that corporate 
successor liability is morally problematic because it is “a matter of chance that some 
corporations have been identified as successors”).
85
 “The argument for reparations fits comfortably enough within the traditional 
paradigm when we make sure the focus is on corporate liability, for the corporate 
actor in question, the United States, is an “individual” under law. Indeed, precisely 
because it is an “individual” that doesn’t die, it can acquire and retain debts over 
many generations, though individual Americans come and go.”  Robert Fullinwider, 
The Case for Reparations, 20 Phil. & Pub. Pol’y Q. 213, 215 (2000).
86
 Fullinwider, supra note 85, at 215-16.
87
 Forde-Mazrui, supra note 8, at 686.
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This means critiquing not the individual slave owners, but the 
government that allowed them to inflict their harm.  Al Brophy writes, 
“the proper understanding may not be class of victims against class of 
perpetrators. It may be more correct to think of reparations in terms of 
a class of victims against the government’s obligation to assist victims. 
Phrased in that way, reparations for slavery and Jim Crow fit 
comfortably alongside dozens [instances where] the government used 
its power to assist those who needed help.”88  Brophy has advanced 
such targeted reparations claims himself, seeking an apology from the 
University of Alabama for its participation in slavery.89  And 
reparations advocates can similarly seek reparations from governments 
that held slaves directly and that thus have directly benefited from 
slavery, while directly inflicting harm on slaves as well.90
This approach also solves the problem of wrongdoer attenuation, 
but does not address victim or act attenuation.  This, it is unclear that 
this strategy would be successful in moving the litigation beyond its 
88
 Brophy, Some Problems, supra note 1, at 519-20; see also Fullinwider, supra
note 85, at 218 (“The real issues are corporate responsibility – the responsibility of 
the nation as a whole – and civic responsibility – the responsibility of each citizen to 
do his fair part in honoring the nation’s obligations. . . . The chief wrongs done to 
African Americans, thus, were not simply the sum of many individual oppressions 
added together but were the corporate acts of a nation. . . And so it is that Americans 
not as individuals but as citizens owe support for the nation’s debt.”); id. at 220 
(“When Congress passed the Civil Liberties Act of 1988 [granting reparations to 
Japanese Americans interned during World War II], no one assumed that individual 
Americans were being held accountable for personal wrongdoing. The interning of 
Japanese Americans was an act of the United States government and its agents. . . 
[each citizen] contributed a small portion, not because he had any personal 
responsibility for the internment but because as a citizen he is required to bear his 
share of the government’s necessary expenditures.”); Hall, supra note 13, at 30 
(“However, this argument, proponents of African American reparations assert, does 
not comport with other comparative issues, including the national debt, for which all 
Americans must continue to pay despite its partial creation by other generations.”).
89
 Davis, supra note 31, at 5.
90 See Wenger, supra note 1, at 239-40 (noting direct governmental 
involvement in slavery).
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current position.  In addition, it needs to be developed further, along 
moral lines, to show the propriety of paying reparations.  Finally, this 
strategy is limited because it potentially (to the extent it targets 
government entities) runs afoul of sovereign immunity.91  This is no 
small concern; Cato was dismissed in part on sovereign immunity 
grounds.92
3.  Establishing Connections to Harm
Some reparations advocates cite to scholarly work showing the 
connections between past slavery and present Black poverty.93  For 
example, Tuneen Chisolm argues that “inequality has been structured 
over many generations through . . . systematic barriers” for Blacks.94
Verdun notes that “comparative statistics on unemployment, income, 
mortality rates, substandard housing, and education” reflect “the 
effects of over 300 years of oppression.”95  Robert Westley notes the 
continuing legacy of slavery as evidenced in the Black underclass.96
This work can potentially be used to defuse victim and act attenuation, 
though it may need further development.
In particular, it will be important to develop and to increase social 
awareness of research documenting the effects of slavery itself, and 
controlling for other variables including general economic problems 
suffered by minorities.  Otherwise, this response — that Blacks are 
poorer, less educated, shorter-lived, and so on — will beg the question 
91 See generally Wenger, supra note 1, at 248-49 (discussing sovereign 
immunity in reparations).
92 Cato v. United States, 70 F.3d 1103, 1107-11 (9th Cir. 1995).
93 See Wenger, supra note 1, at 222-25 (noting sources).
94
 Tuneen E. Chisolm, Sweep Around Your Own Front Door: Examining the 
Argument for Legislative African American Reparations, 147 U. Pa. L. Rev. 677, 
687 (1999); see also id. at 688-90 (noting disparities in crime rate, poverty level, 
home ownership, education, and income).
95
 Verdun, supra note 2, at 664; see also Forde-Mazrui, supra note 8, at 695-99 
(discussing social disadvantages suffered by Blacks and linking them to 
discrimination and slavery).
96
 Westley, supra note 40, at 441-44.
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of how much of the disparity can be traced to slavery.97  The relevant 
question is whether slave descendants are poorer than non-slave 
descendant Blacks; whether slave descendants are less educated than 
non-slave descendant Blacks, and so forth.  Disparate data points, such 
as questions on family structure, must be addressed.98  Anecdotal 
evidence suggests that slave descendants may suffer harm not shared 
by other Blacks.99  But further quantification of the results of social 
research that answers this question — and further publication of data 
that shows this — is required.  It is not enough simply to say that 
Blacks are poorer than whites.100
4.  Fairness and Equity
Finally, reparations advocates have argued that victim and act 
attenuation should be discounted because of fairness or equity 
considerations.  Matsuda has argued that the magnitude of the harm 
justifies treating reparations as a special case:  “the proximate cause 
question is essentially political. . . more egregious wrongs, such as 
intentional torts, justify reaching across wider gulfs of time and space 
97 Cf. Brophy, Taking Reparations Seriously, supra note 34, at 24-25 (noting 
uncertainty of harm created by slavery); Hylton, Framework, supra note 15, at 34-36 
(suggesting other potential contributing causes); Massey, supra note 9, at 163 
(“Racism can and does exist where slavery never did, and racism is surely just one 
among a number of contributors to this deplorable state of affairs.”).
98
 For example, Keith Hylton has argued that “most of the difference between 
white and black family poverty rates can be explained by family structure—
specifically, the low rate of marriage of black families below the poverty line.” 
Hylton, Framework, supra note  15, at 34-35.  
99 See Sara Rimer & Karen W. Arenson, Top Colleges Take More Blacks, but 
Which Ones?, N.Y. Times, June 24, 2004, at A1 (noting that slave descendants are 
less likely than other Blacks to be admitted to prestigious colleges).
100 Cf. Brophy, Taking Reparations Seriously, supra note 34, at 34 (“When we 
are talking about even a modest reparations program, we will want to determine with 
something approaching scientific precision the harm that continues, as well as the 
benefits that have been conferred.”); see also Forde-Mazrui, supra note 8, at 687 & 
nn. 9-10 (discussing arguments that Black disadvantages are a product of Black 
culture).  
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to connect act and injury.”101 Alfreda Robinson invokes the similar 
argument that it would be unfair to allow the state to benefit from 
attenuation caused by its own wrongdoing. 
[G]iven the very high mortality rates caused by the 
deplorable conditions of Forced Labor and the 
murderous lawlessness and intimidation of the Ku Klux 
Klan, it is not surprising that the direct victims are dead. 
. . It is simply unfair to demand that the Reparations 
advocates produce a specific living direct victim now 
for every conceivable claim.102
Also in this vein, scholars note that negative effects on a victim’s 
children are a logical result of wrongdoing.  To the extent that slave 
owners knew that they were harming slaves’ children, note Posner and 
Vermeule, it may be unreasonable to view victim attenuation as an 
obstacle, because slave descendants were a knowable victim 
themselves of slave owner wrongdoing.103  Mari Matsuda makes this 
argument as well.  She notes that, “in determining foreseeability, the 
classical legal mind typically considers whether a reasonable person 
contemplating the consequences of a particular act would have 
imagined the harm that in fact occurred.”104  Since “what a reasonable 
101
 Matsuda, supra note 1, at 382-83; see also id. at 383 (“Proximate cause 
analysis is typically reduced to consideration of the innocence of the victim, the 
culpability of the wrongdoer, the foreseeability and magnitude of the harm, and the 
weight of the broad social goals of fair compensation, deterrence and retribution. . . . 
It would have required no clairvoyant skill to predict the harm that would befall 
Hawaiians from the loss of their nation and land, or the harm that would befall 
Japanese-Americans taken abruptly from their homes to the desert relocation centers. 
What a reasonable person would have predicted would occur, did in fact occur.”)
102
 Robinson, supra note 25, at 353.
103
 Posner & Vermeule, supra note 13, at 700.  See also David Rosenberg, The 
Causal Connection in Mass Exposure Cases: A Public Law Vision of the Tort 
System, 97 Harv. L. Rev. 849, 884-85 (“But one could just as easily describe the 
defendant’s duty in aggregative terms as a duty extending from the defendant to a 
class — the exposed population. . . . The defendant’s wrongdoing inflicts loss on the 
exposed population as a whole.”). 
104
 Matsuda, supra note 1, at 383.  
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person would have predicted did in fact occur,” one classic test for 
proximate causation is satisfied.105
The unfairness argument is unique to the concern of victim 
attenuation.  It is of unknown efficacy.  One potential concern is that it
is a moral and logical argument, while the concerns of standing and 
victim attenuation are legal concerns.  Courts are fickle about 
accepting fairness arguments.  Fairness arguments may also be 
susceptible to moral counter-arguments that also sound in fairness, 
such as the fairness of requiring innocent citizens to bear the burden of 
reparations.  
E.  Recap
This Part has examined expressed attenuation concerns to 
determine their nature.  Attenuation concerns can be broadly broken 
into three main components:  Victim attenuation, wrongdoer 
attenuation, and act attenuation.  These components are important in 
different contexts.  Vic tim attenuation is especially important in the 
legal arena, while wrongdoer attenuation is important in the public and 
legislative arenas.  
Both individually, and as a group, the existing responses to 
attenuation have failed.  Attenuation continues to be a fatal problem 
for reparations litigation, and it continues to be a major problem in 
advancing public acceptance of reparations.  In part, the responses 
have failed because they have not adequately considered the types of 
attenuation that they are addressing, and because they have not 
distinguished between legal and moral concerns.
II. Strategic Considerations:  What Attenuation Means
This Part will discuss the effect that the attenuation critiques have 
on reparations.  In particular, it will discuss the interplay between 
political and legal arguments about attenuation, and will examine how 
105 See Calabresi, supra note 7, at 81 (discussing foreseeability as an element of 
proximate cause).
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these components work together to create an obstacle for reparations.  
It will delineate some ideas for addressing these different types of 
attenuation and their differing effects.
A.  Breakdown of Sub-Types of Attenuation
Stepping back from what courts and politicians have done, we can 
discern some broad patterns and themes.  The attenuation defense is 
manifested in two different spheres.  First, attenuation comes up in the 
moral sphere, with concerns that it is somehow wrong for reparations 
to be paid by those who are not connected to slavery.106  Second, 
attenuation arises in the legal sphere, with objections that reparations 
cannot for legal reasons be paid to plaintiffs who lack standing, or a 
more direct connection to the slaves who were harmed.  These are 
opposite sides of the same coin.107  Just as the idea of reparations is 
based on a joint legal and moral argument,108 attenuation provides a 
joint legal and moral counter-argument.
Different types of attenuation have different roles in this interplay.  
Wrongdoer attenuation is a major component of the moral objection to 
106 Cf. Forde-Mazrui, supra note 8, at 685 (discussing moral arguments about 
reparations and affirmative action).
107 Massey, supra note 9, at 157 (“When grappling with providing reparations 
for slavery, two distinct categories of issues emerge: legal and political.”).
108
 Miller, supra note 13, at 50 (“Reparations, on this account, involves a 
demand for restoration of the ill-gotten gains of slavery to the group that was 
wronged. In so doing, it suggests both a legal strategy and an emotionally compelling 
moral argument.  The legal strategy requires us to identify the various ways that 
blacks were harmed by whites who profited from slavery and then to sue for the 
repayment of those profits either to individuals or into some central fund for more 
general disbursement.  The moral argument asserts that whites as a group were, and 
continue to be, responsible for the ills of the African American community.  It is the 
power and simplicity of that moral claim that makes reparations at once so 
compelling an argument and so difficult for the vast majority of whites to endorse.”); 
cf. Yamamoto, supra note 47, at 518 (“Those seeking reparations need to draw on 
the moral force of their claims (and not frame it legally out of existence) while 
simultaneously radically recasting reparations in a way that both materially benefits 
those harmed and generally furthers some larger interests of mainstream America.”).
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reparations.  Act attenuation is an important part of the legal objection.  
Victim attenuation raises major concerns that are both legal and moral.
The different roles that different types of attenuation play is set out in 
the following chart:
Chart 1:  Types of Attenuation
Legal Objection Moral Objection
Wrongdoer Attenuation Lack of culpability Whites shouldn’t 
have to pay
Victim Attenuation Standing Blacks shouldn’t be 
compensated 
Act Attenuation Causation Lack of entitlement
As the chart sets out, there are six different sub-types of the 
attenuation argument.  And as a result of the different types of 
attenuation and the different spheres where they are used (moral or 
legal), reparations advocates must address them each of these 
concerns.  Legal concerns impact reparations lawsuits, while moral 
concerns undermine legislative attempts to seek reparations.109
These sub-types are related to each other.  In particular, in the 
reparations context, legal concerns of victim and act attenuation are 
interrelated.  Victim attenuation problems of standing exist because 
courts are unsure that current claimants can show a harm to them.  The 
same perceived inability to show harm would inevitably create act 
attenuation concerns at any trial.  Thus, at least within the legal sphere 
in reparations, victim attenuation and act attenuation have a similar 
109
 The repeated use of attenuation saps the moral strength of reparations 
arguments, weakening the case for reparations in the public eye.  See Brophy, 
Reparations Talk, supra note 1, at 86 (“The future of the movement undoubtedly will 
be determined in large part by our success in making a compelling moral argument 
for reparations that gains political support.”).
Moral concerns may also have indirect effects on legal outcomes.  See Forde-
Mazrui, supra note 8, at 691.
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cause and are closely linked.  (There is some difference between them.  
In particular, a weaker connection between victims and harm may 
satisfy the victim attenuation standing concerns, while a stronger 
connection may eventually need to be shown to establish causation at 
trial.)
It is generally necessary to address concerns by using arguments of 
the same legal or moral type.  Legal concerns about attenuation must 
be addressed with legal arguments, and moral concerns with moral 
arguments.  The legal concern of standing (victim attenuation) cannot 
be adequately addressed by moral arguments alone, despite the fact 
that some moral arguments on fairness are quite strong.  Similarly, 
strong moral arguments against wrongdoer attenuation — that 
“innocent” whites should not be forced to pay for slavery — will not 
be adequately addressed by legal strategies that target governments 
and corporations that, through their long legal lives, were direct 
participants in slavery.  
The legal and moral dimensions of reparations correspond closely 
to the different theories of justice that reparations advocates rely 
upon.110  Reparationists walk a fine line between corrective and 
distributive justice.111  Corrective justice attempts to put people in the 
position they would have been if the wrongful act had not occurred.  
Dis tributive justice is the idea that wealth should be more evenly 
distributed to the less fortunate.112
110 See generally Peter Benson, The Basis of Corrective Justice and its Relation 
to Distributive Justice, 77 Iowa L. Rev. 515, 515-30 (1992) (discussing differences 
between corrective and distributive justice ideas); Ernest J. Weinrib, The Idea of 
Private Law (1995) (same); Stephen Perry, On the Relationship between Corrective 
and Distributive Justice, in Oxford Essays in Jurisprudence, 4th series (Jeremy 
Horder, ed., 2000). 
111 See Hylton, Framework, supra note  15, at 32 (noting “two distinct and in 
some ways conflicting policies behind reparations litigation.  One approach is driven 
in large part by social welfare and distributional goals.  The other approach is based 
on a desire to correct historical injustices; simply to ‘do justice.’”).
112 See id. at 33 (“At the heart of the FleetBoston [reparations] suit is a belief 
that reparations litigation will compensate or correct for years and years of 
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Some argue that corrective justice requires society to compensate 
for harms suffered by Blacks.113  Others advocate ideas that are based 
on distributive justice.114  Distributive justice ideas do not fit well 
within the tort system, which is a corrective justice system.115
Attenuation arguments may have different effects depending on the 
theory of justice one espouses.  Wrongdoer attenuation, for instance, 
may be more important in corrective justice, with the idea that the 
bilateral nature of corrective justice is not just that the victim receives 
compensation, but that the guilty party pays.
B. Practical Results of Successful Legal Attenuation Arguments
Many reparations advocates candidly admit that reparations are 
unlikely to be awarded at trial, and that the most fruitful route is 
legislative act or some sort of settlement.116  Indeed, victories for other 
groups that have sought reparations have come through settlement, not 
trial.117  However, one key to settlement is the existence of potentially 
inattention, or insufficient attention, to the welfare of African Americans.”).  This is 
similar to the redistributive goal of the tobacco class action litigation.  Id.; see also
Massey, supra note 9, at 158-67 (discussing the two different approaches).
113
 Forde-Mazrui, supra note 8, at 685, 707-09; David Lyons, Corrective 
Justice, Equal Opportunity, and the Legacy of Slavery and Jim Crow, Boston 
University School lf Law, Working Paper Series, Public Law & Legal Theory, No. 
03-15, available at 
http://www.bu.edu/law/faculty/papers/pdf_files/LyonsD073003.pdf (2003).
114 See, e.g., Matsuda, supra note 1, at 375-80.
115
 Lyons, supra note 113, at 1-4; Forde-Mazrui, supra note 8, at 685, 707-09.
116
 Westley, supra note 40, at 436 (arguing that it is Congress, and possibly 
state legislatures, that must be persuaded to enact reparations); Brophy, Some 
Problems, supra note 1, at 534-39 (noting need for development of dialogue and 
scholarship to address the possibility of settlement); Miller, supra note 13, at 51-57 
(suggesting that settlement is more likely to be successful than litigation); Wenger, 
supra note 1, at 256-58 (same).
117
 These have included reparations for Holocaust victims and for Americans of 
Japanese Ancestry imprisoned during World War II.  See Posner & Vermeule, supra
note 13, at 694-98 (noting Holocaust and AJA cases); Brophy, Some Problems, 
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valid legal claims, and another key is the exertion of political 
pressure.118 Any eventual settlement will need to be palatable to the 
general populace.119 Thus, it is likely that a chronology for reparations 
success will follow certain stages:
Stage one:  Initial claims are presented.  Non-colorable claims are 
unsuccessful in the courts.  Politicians do not take claims seriously.  
This is the current state of reparations litigation.
Stage two:  Colorable claims are presented.  These result in a 
plaintiff’s victory, at least at the District level.  The inevitable appeal 
forces courts and politicians to reexamine the idea of reparations.
Stage three:  Politicians and media figures begin to take 
reparations claims seriously.  There is a public debate and assessment 
of important issues at the political and public level.
Stage four:  If it is deemed politically feasible, a settlement offer 
may be made.
This timeline follows the general timelines of many mass tort and 
reparations actions.120  It will require that reparations advocates devise 
supra note 1, at 499-500; Westley, supra note 40, at 449-59; In Re Holocaust 
Victims Assets Litigation, 105 F. Supp. 2d 139 (E.D.N.Y. 2000) (approving 
settlement).
118 See Yamamoto, supra note 47, at 479-82; 496-97 (discussing political 
element in reparations advocacy); Brophy, Takings Reparations Seriously, supra
note 34, at 38-39; Hylton, Framework, supra note  15, at 34 (“Proponents of . . . 
reparations claims believe that significant redistribution towards groups that make up 
America’s underclass will not be achieved through legislative action.  Thus, 
reparations proponents have turned to the courts.”).
119 See Hopkins, supra note 23, at 2539 (noting that any settlement will require 
support from white voters).  Reparations advocates must bear in mind the interest 
convergence problem, as laid out by Derrick Bell — that Blacks are most likely to be 
politically successful when they can convince whites that their political interests are 
aligned.  Brophy, Taking Reparations Seriously, supra note 34, at 39; Derrick Bell, 
Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-Convergence Dilemma, 93 Harv. L. 
Rev. 518 (1980).
120 Cf. See Robert L. Rabin, A Sociolegal History of the Tobacco Tort 
Litigation, 44 Stan. L. Rev. 853, 874-75 (1992); Peter H. Schuck, Agent Orange on 
Trial (1986) (describing trial and resolution, including process of arriving at 
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legal strategies to advance past Cato, and Slave Descendants which 
keep reparations stalled at the first Stage.  That is, both legal and moral 
concerns must be addressed prior to any settlement.
Chart 2:  Simplified Strategic Chronology 
Legal 
Concerns 
Addressed
Moral 
Concerns 
Addressed
Settlement
Given this timeline, the effect of attenuation concerns —
particularly the unrebutted legal concerns — becomes more clear.  The 
movement for reparations suits is currently living “in the shadow of” 
attenuation.  Unrebutted legal attenuation concerns are an immediate 
problem.  Unrebutted moral concerns will also eventually need to be 
addressed. 
As suggested earlier, responses to attenuation have not been 
particularly effective.  Our analytical tools give a reason for this:  
Responses to attenuation have failed to appreciate the different sub-
types of argument.  The result is that not all attenuation arguments 
have been adequately addressed.
settlement); In Re Holocaust Victims Assets Litigation, 105 F. Supp. 2d 139 
(E.D.N.Y. 2000) (approving settlement).
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Chart 3:  Responses to Attenuation
Legal Response Moral Response 
Wrongdoer Attenuation Suits against 
government and 
corporations
None (possibly group 
benefit)
Victim Attenuation None Fairness, Group harm
Act Attenuation None (possibly 
social research)
Fairness
As this chart demonstrates, three of the six sub-types of attenuation 
have yet to be addressed by reparations advocates.  In addition, the 
limited effectiveness of some responses to attenuation makes the case 
against attenuation even weaker.  Suits against government solve the 
problem of wrongdoer attenuation in the legal sphere, but may be 
unworkable due to sovereign immunity.  Fairness responses are 
probably more effective in the moral sphere.  An assessment of the 
effectiveness of responses to attenuation is thus:
Chart 4:  Effectiveness of Responses to Attenuation
Legal Response Moral Response 
Wrongdoer 
Attenuation
Suits against government and 
corporations
Effectiveness:  Limited due to 
sovereign immunity.
None (possibly group 
benefit)
Effectiveness:  
Ineffective
Victim 
Attenuation
None 
Effectiveness:  Ineffective
Fairness, Group harm
Effectiveness:  
Moderate.
Act
Attenuation
None (possibly social research)
Effectiveness:  Ineffective
Fairness
Effectiveness:  
Moderate.
An immediate and striking feature that is evident from Chart 4 is 
that the current responses to attenuation in the legal sphere have been 
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limited, ineffective, or non-existent.  This is particularly problematic 
given the importance of a strong legal case if reparations is to have any 
chance of succeeding.
The current situation for reparations is thus precarious.  Little 
progress has been made in the courts, due to the continued inability to 
avoid legal attenuation concerns.  The lack of progress in the courts 
means that governments and corporations feel little pressure or threat 
that a judgment will be rendered against them.121  This lack of pressure 
allows the government and private actors to dismiss reparations claims 
in the public and legislative spheres.  Since there is no pressure created 
by litigation, governments need not view reparations as “serious.”122
It is crucial to resolve causation and attenuation concerns quickly 
because the attenuation problem is not going to get better.  Attenuation 
is a losing battle of attrition for reparations advocates, because every 
day, slavery becomes more attenuated.  If reparations advocates cannot 
move the litigation forward quickly, they run the risk of being trapped 
in a quagmire, and never advancing past Stage One.
C. Preliminary Notes on Addressing Attenuation
Before moving on to some specific legal ideas for addressing 
attenuation, we will go over some preliminary points that will inform 
our discussion.  First, not all sub-types of attenuation are equally 
121 Cf. Hylton, Slavery, supra note 22, at 1 (“Like all lawsuits, this one has the 
power to force one’s attention.”).  In this sense, the courts act as gatekeepers, and 
screen out reparations proposals that are unworthy of attention.
122
 The end goal for most litigants in the modern court system is to reach a 
settlement.  See Samuel R. Gross & Kent D. Syverd, Don’t Try: Civil Jury Verdicts
in a System Geared to Settlement, 44 UCLA L. Rev. 1, 2-3 (1996) (noting that most 
law suits filed in America settle, and most of the remainder are dismissed); Peter H. 
Scheck, The Role of the Judge in Settling Complex Cases: The Agent Orange 
Example, 53 U. Chi. L. Rev. 337, 337 (1986) (noting that most cases settle before 
trial); Mark Galanter & Mia Cahill, “Most Cases Settle”: Judicial Promotion and 
Regulation of Settlements, 46 Stan. L. Rev. 1339 (1994) (discussing phenomenon 
and perception of settlement).  
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important.  At the present, a particularly important concern is victim 
attenuation in the legal sphere.  This is the concern which has blocked 
the advancement of reparations cases in the courts.  Thus, the most 
important task right now is addressing legal victim attenuation.123
Other concerns are on the horizon.  For example, moral concerns 
about wrongdoer attenuation may be an important hurdle for 
settlement.  Reparations advocates must address both legal arguments, 
in order to present a colorable claim which payers wish to settle, and 
moral arguments, so that a settlement is politically feasible.124
Second, reparations advocates should be aware of how their 
arguments relate to the broad distributive versus corrective justice 
concerns.  Some arguments against attenuation may imply a move 
away from corrective and towards distributive justice.  This may 
weaken the case for bringing reparations under the tort banner, and 
suggest that like other distributive justice devices they should be 
legislated.125  But such a settlement will be most likely if a viable legal 
case puts pressure on payers to settle.  Thus, it is important to use the 
tools of corrective justice, the tort system, to create the pressure that 
may ultimately lead to a remedy from the legislature, which may look 
more like distributive justice.  To the extent that attenuation concerns 
undercut the corrective justice argument, they must be addressed, but 
not in a way that moves the discussion completely away from 
corrective justice.
123 As noted earlier, the legal concerns of victim and act attenuation are closely 
related.  The victim attenuation concern of standing is related to an inability of 
current claimants to show harm.  To the extent that plaintiffs show harm, they may 
address both victim and act attenuation concerns.
124 Cf. Brophy, Taking Reparations Seriously, supra note 34, at 39-41 
(discussing the need for a politically palatable reparations plan); Yamamoto, supra
note 47, at 479-96 (discussing the political element in reparations).
125 Cf. Richard Epstein, The Case Against Black Reparations, __ B.U. L. Rev. 
__, *9 (2004) (“Why think of the claim as one for reparations when the program 
looks far more like some legislative initiative that does not have to observe the 
standard constraints of corrective justice, but simply has to command sufficient 
political support to pass.”).
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I will use the remainder of the Article to discuss conceptual and
theoretical tools which can address attenuation, in particular legal 
concerns of victim attenuation.  This priority is because victim 
attenuation is the most pressing concern at present, and must be 
addressed in order to move past the current roadblock.  Part III will 
discuss what may be the best option for addressing legal concerns of 
victim attenuation:  The use of causation tools developed in the mass 
tort context.
Following that discussion, I will give some preliminary ideas on 
next steps in developing conceptual theories of causation and 
responsibility that allow reparations to be accepted by legislatures and 
the public.  A full analysis and rebuttal of all of the moral and legal 
issues of attenuation is beyond the scope of this Article.  In particular, 
moral concerns and concerns of act and wrongdoer attenuation will 
necessarily remain underdeveloped within this Article.  However, the 
discussion should provide useful analysis for addressing other types of 
attenuation.
III. Using the Tools of Mass Torts to Address Attenuation in 
the Courts
It is very surprising that, despite the profound analogy between 
attenuation and similar concerns that come up in mass tort, reparations 
advocates have not employed the theoretical tools from the mass tort 
context.  Courts and scholars have addressed complicated issues of 
causation in the mass tort context.  Indeed, slavery itself can be viewed 
as one of the earliest mass torts.
In this Part, I will explore the analogy between reparations and 
mass torts.  I do this as follows.  Section A will discuss some of the 
issues of causation that arise in the mass tort context.  Section B will 
examine similarities between causation issues in mass torts and in 
reparations.  Section C will discuss some solutions that have emerged 
in the mass tort context, both theoretical and practical, and will discuss 
how these apply to reparations. 
A.  Problems of Causation in Mass Torts
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It is not unusual for a tort to have more than one potential cause.126
Courts often deal with cases where it is not possible to know whether a 
defendant’s act would have led to the injury or whether other 
intervening factors would have prevented an injury.  It is similarly 
impossible in many instances to know whether a defendant’s taking 
precautions would have prevented an injury.  The problem is that a 
single event may be logically traceable to more than one cause, 
meaning that each cause individually is underdeterminative.
Underdetermination is caused by the inability to know which of 
potential competing causes contributed to a harm.127 For example, if a 
sailor falls off of a ship and drowns, and the ship did not maintain 
adequate safeguards, it may be impossible to know if the safety 
measures would have saved the sailor.128  The sailor may have been 
swept overboard despite the precautions; the cause of his death is 
underdetermined.  
Underdetermination arises often in the mass tort context.  Mass 
torts typically involve a large number of plaintiffs harmed by a 
defendant’s product.  Where the harm manifests in a physical disease 
126
 Every effect has multiple causes.  Wex S. Malone, Ruminations on Cause-
in-Fact, 9 Stan. L. Rev. 60, 62 (1956); see also Wright, supra note 7, at 1737 (noting 
that there are innumerable causes for each injury); id. at 1780-85 (discussing tort 
scholarship about multiple causes); Glen O. Robinson, Multiple Causation in Tort 
Law:  Reflections on the DES Cases, 68 Va. L. Rev. 713, 713-14 (causation is vague 
and manipulable, more than a simple question of fact, and actual cause involves 
policy questions just as proximate cause does).
127 See Aaron Twerski & Anthony J. Sebok, Liability Without Cause? Further 
Ruminations on Cause-In-Fact as Applied to Handgun Liability, 32 Conn. L. Rev. 
1379, 1380 (2000) (“The problem was one of underdetermination. The reason we 
don’t know if the defendant’s breach of duty caused the injury is because we don’t 
know whether the victim was in a position to benefit from the increase in safety that 
the duty was supposed to guarantee.”); see also Malone, supra note 126, at 65 
(stating that the process of determining causation is often “basically conjecture”); see 
generally Michael Dummett, Frege: Philosophy of Language (1981) (discussing the 
conceptual idea of underdetermination).
128
 Malone, supra note 126, at 76.
CAUSATION AND ATTENUATION
43
that can have many causes, underdetermination is common, and 
showing conventional causation can be difficult.129  As Margaret 
Berger notes, harms for which plaintiffs seek compensation may be 
“found in others who have not been exposed to the substance or 
product in question.” Thus, “it is impossible to tell whether an 
individual plaintiff’s injury is attributable to the product or whether it 
would have manifested itself anyhow.”130  This difficulty results from 
the number of causes that can contribute to a disease; as another 
commentator notes, “rarely is any particular toxic agent the exclusive 
source of a given disease.  Insidious diseases generally have several 
sources, each of which may be sufficient to bring about the 
condition.”131
Judge Weinstein, in the Agent Orange case, was faced with a 
complex problem of underdetermination.  He noted that it was quite 
possible that no particular plaintiff would be able to trace her injuries 
to a particular defendant, and that only statistics would show any harm 
at all.  He illustrated such a scenario:
Let us assume that there are 10 manufacturers and a 
population of 10 million persons exposed to their product. 
Assume that among this population 1,000 cancers of a 
129 See Margaret A. Berger, Eliminating General Causation: Notes Towards a 
New Theory of Justice and Toxic Torts, 97 Colum. L. Rev. 2117, 2123 (1997) 
(“None of these categories of evidence is capable, however, of proving conclusively 
a cause and effect relationship . . . Evidence of this kind is inherently subject to 
considerable uncertainty and inconclusiveness.”); Steve Gold, Note, Causation in 
Toxic Torts:  Burdens of Proof, Standards of Persuasion, and Statistical Evidence, 96 
Yale L.J. 376, 380 (1986).
130Id. at 2121-22; see also Gold, supra note 129, at 376 (“Proving the cause of 
injuries that remain latent for years, are associated with diverse risk factors, and 
occur at background levels even without any apparent cause, is the central problem 
for toxic tort plaintiffs.”).
131
 Rosenberg, supra note 103, at 856; see also Jack B. Weinstein, Individual 
Justice in Mass Tort Litigation (1995) (discussing this problem); Robinson, supra
note 126, at 759 (stating that a deterministic causation approach that assumes a clean 
relation between an act and the injury is not useful in indeterminate cases which 
require probabilistic evidence).
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certain type could be expected, but that 1,100 exist, and 
that this increase is “statistically significant,” permitting a 
reasonable conclusion that 100 cancers are due to the 
product of the manufacturers.132
In such a case, Weinstein recognized, “no plaintiff can show that 
his or her cancer was caused by any one of the defendants.”133  The 
Agent Orange case was a clear instance of the underdetermined 
causation that is so common in mass torts.  Similar concerns have 
dogged lawsuits seeking compensation for harm caused by products 
such as tobacco, asbestos, and DES.  
These concerns were also particularly acute in the DES 
litigation.134  DES was a drug which was used widely over a twenty-
four year period, until it was found to cause reproductive illness in 
children of pregnant women who took the drug.135  DES was 
manufactured by a variety of companies, and many different types of 
DES tablets, made by different manufacturers, were interchanged 
freely.136  They were fungible products.  Not only was it difficult to 
determine whether plaintiffs’ injury arose from DES; it was also 
difficult to trace the harm to any particular defendant.137  In most 
cases, claims were brought by daughters of women who ingested DES.  
In some cases, claims were brought by granddaughters of the women 
as well.138 There may be no area of law where underdetermination has 
been more closely examined than mass torts.  
B.  The Reparations Analogy
132
 In re “Agent Orange” Litig., 597 F. Supp. 740, 837 (E.D.N.Y. 1984).
133 Id.
134 See Richard M. Russell, Note, The Causation Requirement:  Guardian of 
Fairness or Obstacle to Justice?  Making Sense of a Decade of DES Litigation, 25 
Suffolk U. L. Rev. 1071, 1080-81 (1991).
135 See generally Robinson, supra note 126, at 713-17.
136 Id. at 722-26.
137 Id.
138 See generally John B. Maynard, Note, Third-Generation-DES Claims, 27 
New Eng. L. Rev. 241, 285 (1992).
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Using the terminology developed in Part II of this Article, we can 
see how underdetermination relates to the previously examined 
categories of attenuation.  It is evident that the problems of 
underdetermination that affect mass torts have much in common with 
the attenuation difficulties that plague reparations lawsuits.  Mass torts 
present the same concerns of victim, wrongdoer and act attenuation. 
In both cases the real problem is the same.  There is a potential 
connection between claimants and payers, but it is of undeterminable 
strength.  It is hard to match the victim to the wrongdoer, and to match 
the parties to the harm.  
In fact, many mass tort issues could be reframed, using the 
categories of attenuation we have previously discussed.  For example, 
the problems of tracing a particular cancer to a defendant’s product are 
created by act attenuation.  The problem of identifying a culpable 
defendant from among a pool who have manufactured fungible 
products in a large market is a problem of wrongdoer attenuation.  And 
the problem of connecting a harm to children and grandchildren of the 
originally harmed party — the so-called “DES granddaughters” — are 
problems of victim attenuation.  In addition, the causation problem 
related to the victim attenuation concern of standing.
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Chart 5:  Mass Tort Issues as Mapped onto Attenuation Grid
Wrongdoer Attenuation Tracing harm to a specific tortfeasor139
Victim Attenuation Tracing harm to later victims; DES 
granddaughters; causation issues leading to 
standing concerns
Act Attenuation Linking harm to defendants
As in the mass tort context, the harm to modern slave descendants 
caused by of slavery is of underdetermined causation.  Like the case of 
ships and safeguards, like in the case of DES granddaughters or Agent 
Orange veterans, we cannot know if a defendant’s alternate choice not 
to enslave would have resulted in greater assets being given to any 
particular slave descendant. Since reparations presents a problem 
analogous to mass torts, it is helpful to see how courts have addressed 
these issues in the mass torts context.
C.  Solving the Underdetermination Problem
Tort law in general, and mass torts in particular, has developed 
means of dealing with underdetermination. While underdetermination 
complicates the legal questions of causation, it does not altogether rule 
out a finding of legal causation.  This Section will discuss how tort law 
handles underdetermination: Section 1 will discuss theoretical 
background, and Section 2 will discuss the use of statistical evidence.  
Sec tion 3 will then apply these ideas to the problems of act, victim, 
and wrongdoer attenuation.
1.  Conceptualizing Recovery in Underdetermined Cases
139
 Also, issues of wrongdoer attenuation may arise in addressing successor 
liability for damages.  See generally Michael D. Green, Successor Liability:  The 
Superiority of Statutory Reform to Protect Products Liability Claimants, 72 Cornell 
L. Rev. 17 (1986) (discussing theoretical successor liability issues).
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This Section will examine some conceptual and theoretical tools 
used in underdetermined cases.  Two important ideas are loss of 
chance and burden shifting.  Following a discussion of those concepts,
as well as some general considerations, this Section will discuss how 
these have been used in mass tort cases.
a. Loss of Chance
The tort system allows recovery in some underdetermined cases.140
A useful example is the imposition of liability for those ships that did 
not adequately protect against being washed overboard.  In a well-
known law review article, Wex Malone studied these cases and found 
that courts moved from a policy of not imposing liability to a policy of 
imposing liability nearly all of the time.141  Significantly, courts were 
willing to impose liability despite the conceptual difficulty of not 
knowing whether the victim would have been in a position to benefit 
from the increase in safety.142  “It would be futile for the courts to 
recognize a duty to provide emergency equipment and to impose an 
obligation to proceed promptly to the rescue if the defendant could 
always seize upon the uncertainty which nearly always attends the 
rescue operation as a reason for dismissing the claim,” noted 
Malone.143
Tort scholars have suggested various theoretical approaches 
explaining why courts should allow liability even where causation is 
underdetermined.  Wex Malone refers to many of these cases as 
involving the loss of a “gambler’s chance.”144 In such cases, a 
140 See Twerski & Sebok, supra note 127, at 1381; Malone, supra note 126, at 
72-73.
141
 Malone, supra note 126, at 75-77.
142
 Twerski & Sebok, supra note 127, at 1380; Gray, supra note 8, at 97-100 & 
n.18 (discussing cases).
143 Malone, supra note 126, at 75-77.
144 Id. at 80; see also Twerski & Sebok, supra note 127, at 1381.  The loss of 
the gambler’s chance can be a significant loss; in many instances, without a 
defendant’s actions, “some value would have been preserved.”  Malone, supra note 
126, at 80.
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defendant facilitates the realization of an independently created risk.145
Courts are not always willing to find liability in gambler’s chance 
cases, however, and are most willing to find liability in cases where a 
defendant had notice of a potential harm.146  Similarly, courts are more 
willing to find liability where defendants violated a rule “designed to 
protect” against the harm that in fact occurred.147  The gambler’s 
chance lost by slave descendants is likely to be quite substantial. 148
b.  Burden Shifting and Other Factors
A second technique is to shift the burden of proof.149  After all, in 
many underdetermined cases, it can be impossible to show either 
causation or non-causation.  Courts may shift the burden to defendants, 
as the court chose to in Summers v. Tice, the classic case involving a 
hunting accident where it was impossible to determine which of two 
negligent shooters had caused the injury.150  The court held that 
“practical justice” allowed the burden to shift to defendants, to 
establish that they were not the cause of harm.151  Some courts have 
applied similar reasoning in the mass tort litigation over DES.  
145
 Twerski & Sebok, supra note 127, at 1383.  See also id. at 1383-84 (giving 
examples); Robert L. Rabin, Enabling Torts, 49 DePaul L. Rev. 435, 439-48 (1999).  
146
 Twerski & Sebok, supra note 127, at 1385-86.
147
 Malone, supra note 126, at 72.
148
 Hylton, Slavery, supra note 22, at 39, suggests that descendants might have 
an approximately forty percent chance of inheriting excess wealth from four 
generations removed.   Id. at 39.
149
 Robinson, supra note 126, at 721-26; Gray, supra note 8, at 117-18 
(discussing burden shifting).
150 Id. at 715; 33 Cal. 2d 80, 86-88 (1948). The court ruled that both hunters 
could be held liable.  Id.; see also Malone, supra note 126, at 83 (stating that the 
court was unwilling to let “two wrongdoers pass the ball”); Keeton et al., supra note 
8, at 271 (“It seems a very desirable solution where negligence on the part of both 
defendants is very clear, and it is only the issue of causation which is in doubt, so 
that the choice must be made between letting the loss due to failure of proof fall on 
the innocent plaintiff or the culpable defendants.”); Gray, supra note 8, at 102-04 
(same).
151
 33 Cal. 2d 80, 86-88 (1948).
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c.  Other General Considerations
Scholars have suggested that courts are most likely to find liability 
in cases where causation is underdetermined if certain other factors are 
present.  For example, courts are more willing to find liability if the 
tort is an intentional tort, or if its harm is easily foreseeable.152  Courts 
may reject cases where the chance of harm is particularly low.153  And 
they may be likely to find liability where a party engaged in 
particularly noxious acts.154
Courts may apply the “substantial factor” test, allowing liability in 
cases where a defendant’s actions were a substantial factor leading to 
the plaintiff’s harm.155  A defendant’s actions will be considered a 
substantial factor in causing a harm if they “satisf[y] the but-for test 
(with an exception for simultaneous independent sufficient causes) 
[and are] an appreciable and continuously effective or efficient factor 
in producing the harm, up to the time of occurrence of the harm.”156
The substantial factor test allows courts to decide whether there is 
close enough affinity for the law to intervene and label a defendant’s 
conduct “wrong.”157
152
 Twerski & Sebok, supra note 127, at 1381; Malone, supra note 126, at 73, 
85-87.
153 See Twerski & Sebok, supra note 127, at 1387 (noting that the lower the 
probability that defendant’s act was not a cause, the higher the probability of a court 
imposing liability); see also id. at 1387-90 (discussing the difficulty of dealing with 
low probabilities in a world of full compensation).  The conceptual problem is that a 
court may be faced with two unpleasant choices:  either to overdeter, or to allow 
defendants to escape liability entirely.  Id.  
154 See id. at 1386 (suggesting that the very production of handguns carries 
culpability); Rabin, supra note 145, at 453 (noting that handguns are designed for a 
dangerous purpose).
155
 Malone, supra note 126, at 89-95 (discussing the substantial factor test).
156
 Wright, supra note 7, at 1781-82; see also Robinson, supra note 126, at 751 
(noting that the substantial factor test is similar to the but-for test). One benefit of the 
substantial factor test is that it prevents minor causes from creating liability.  Id. at 
715-16.
157
 Malone, supra note 126, at 72.
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d.  Application in Mass Tort Context
Courts have applied loss of chance and burden shifting to allow 
recovery in mass tort cases.  Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories used 
burden shifting, holding defendant DES manufacturers liable unless 
they could show that they did not cause plaintiffs’ harm.158  The court 
held that since multiple actors contributed to the harm, and causation 
was not individually traceable, all of the potential contributors could 
be held responsible.159 Sindell has been called  “modified Summers” 
case because it allowed defendants to pay in proportion to the harm 
they caused.160  The court adopted reasoning similar to Summers, 
noting that “as between an innocent plaintiff and negligent defendants, 
the latter should bear the cost of the injury.”161 Another DES court 
noted in a similar vein:
There have been several approaches in tort law 
available to a plaintiff confronted with more than one 
actor who could be the causation in fact. In such 
instances where each such party acted independently 
but tortiously and it is proved that injury has been 
caused to plaintiff by only one of them, but there is 
uncertainty as to which one caused it, and where each 
can be joined as a defendant in the case, some courts 
have shifted the burden of proof of causation in fact to 
the defendants.162
That court also found that since defendants had acted in a similar 
manner, and were aware of the possibility of harm, they could be held 
liable, even if the harm could not be directly traced to one particular 
158 Id. at 717; see 26 Cal. 3d 588, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980).  The court 
opted to make the DES manufacturers show that they did not cause the injury, rather 
than making the victims show causation.  Robinson, supra note 126, at 714-15.  The 
court adopted this position in part because it was easier for defendants to maintain 
the kind of data that could be used to either show, or disprove, causation.  Id. at 734.
159 Id. at 729.
160
 Gray, supra note 8, at 105-06.
161
 26 Cal. 3d at 610-11.
162
 Bichler v. Eli Lilly and Co., 79 A.D.2d 317, 324-25 (N.Y. App. Div. 1981).
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defendant.163  Other DES courts have also adopted some version of 
group liability.164  This is similar to the idea of “enterprise liability,” 
which was applied in other mass tort settings to find that all actors in 
an industry are liable for foreseeable harms.165
On DES granddaughters, courts have divided in those cases, with 
some courts allowing DES granddaughters to pursue claims against the 
DES manufacturers, and other courts barring these claims.166 The 
burden shifting used by some DES courts is dispositive, since typically 
defendants are as unable to disprove causation as plaintiffs are unable 
to prove it.167
Another useful analysis of causation can be found in the district 
court opinion in Hamilton v. Accu-Tek, which dealt with a class action 
suit against handgun manufacturers for the harms cause by negligent 
distribution of handguns.168  In that opinion — which was later 
reversed on other grounds169 — the district court found causation 
despite some misgivings about underdetermination.  The judge noted 
163 Id. at 325-26.
164 See, e.g., Collins v. Eli Lilly & Co., 116 Wis. 2d 166 (1984); see generally 
Robert A. Baruch Bush, Between Two Worlds: The Shift from Individual to Group 
Responsibility in the Law of Causation of Injury, 33 UCLA L. Rev. 1473, 1483 -97 
(1986) (discussing several DES cases).  This development was also rejected by some 
courts.  See, e.g., Payton v. Abbott Laboratories, 386, Mass. 540 (1982).
165 See, e.g., Hall v. E. I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., Inc., 345 F. Supp. 353 
(E.D.N.Y. 1972).  
166 See id. at 251-61 (discussing cases); DeMayo v. Schmitt, No. 625, 1989 
Phila. Cty. Rptr. LEXIS 73, at *1 (C.P. Philadelphia County Dec. 28, 1989) 
(allowing claim for negligence to be stated); Enright v. Eli Lilly & Co., 570 N.E. 2d 
198 (N.Y. 1991) (claim could not proceed because of preconception tort doctrine); 
McMahon v. Eli Lilly & Co., 774 F.2d 830 (7th Cir. 1985) (permitting third 
generation claim); Bowe v. Abbott Laboratories, 608 N.E. 2d 223 (Ill. App. 1992); 
Grover v. Eli Lilly & Co., 591 N.E. 2d 696 (Ohio 1992) (denying recovery); see 
generally Julie A. Greenberg, Reconceptualizing Preconception Torts, 64 Tenn. L. 
Rev. 315, 320-28 (discussing the cases).
167
 Robinson, supra note 126, at 729.
168
 Hamilton v. Accu-Tek, 62 F.Supp.2d 802 (E.D.N.Y. 1999), rev’d on other 
grounds, 264 F.3d 21 (2d Cir. 2001).
169
 264 F.3d 21 (2d Cir. 2001).
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that the defendants’ conduct was a “significant contributing factor in 
the development” of the ultimate harm.170  The evidence, wrote the 
court, 
was sufficient to permit a reasonable jury to conclude 
that the negligent marketing and distribution of 
handguns by manufacturers was a substantial factor in 
the promotion and development of an underground 
illegal market supplying New York criminals, and thus 
increasing the probability of death or serious injury [to 
plaintiffs].171
This decision has been critiqued;172 indeed it is no longer good 
law.  However, its causation analysis appears to ask the right questions 
to determine whether liability can be found despite 
underdetermination.  The court asks whether a defendants’ conduct 
was a “significant contributing factor in the development” of a harm or 
“a substantial factor . . . increasing the probability” of plaintiffs’ 
harm.173  The underlying inquiry, as suggested by commentators, is “if
defendants had behaved differently, how many fewer plaintiffs would 
have been harmed?”174
2.  Use of Statistical Evidence to Show Causation
Faced with a variety of difficulties in showing causation in mass 
tort cases, advocates, scholars, and courts have developed methods for 
showing causation through statistical evidence.  Scholars have argued 
that a “probabilistic approach to causation” is proper in cases where a 
large number of plaintiffs have been harmed by a group of defendants, 
170 Id. at 838.
171 Id.  On the jury’s role in assessing punishment, see generally Kaimipono 
David Wenger & David A. Hoffman, Nullificatory Juries, 2003 Wisc. L. Rev. 1115, 
1148-56.
172 See Twerski & Sebok, supra note 127, at 1400.
173
 62 F.Supp.2d at 838.
174
 Twerski & Sebok, supra note 127, at 1403-04.
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and where intervening causation is possible, resulting in inability to 
definitely trace any individual plaintiff’s injury to an individual 
defendant’s actions.175  In these cases, scholars suggest that the amount 
recovered should be based on a “probability of causation” for a 
defendant.176
In Agent Orange, Judge Weinstein suggested that plaintiffs would 
divide any recovery to reflect the statistical increase in likelihood of 
harm they suffered.177  He applied statistical causation, and used a type 
of proportional liability in allocating damages following the Agent 
175
 Robinson, supra note 126, at 759-60; Gold, supra note 129, at 384 (noting 
that mass tort cases rarely involve particularistic evidence); Wendy Wagner, Note, 
Trans-Science in Torts, 96 Yale L.J. 428, 433 n.28 (collecting cases); Mario J. Rizzo 
& Frank S. Arnold, Causal Apportionment in the Law of Torts: An Economic 
Theory, 80 Colum. L. Rev. 1399 (1980) (advocating the use of probabilistic 
causation in multiple cause cases).
176 Id. at 749-66; see also Bush, supra note 164, at 1490-92; Jack B. Weinstein 
and Robert Kushen, Scientific Evidence in Complex Litigation, C-607 ALI-ABA 
Course of Study, July 24, 1991, at 709, 724 (“Statistical data may . . . permit 
combinations of anecdotal and valid statistical data to prove guilt or establish some 
material proposition of fact.”); but cf. Wright, supra note 7, at 1827 (suggesting that 
such devices may result in the tort system becoming more of a wealth redistribution 
system and less of a corrective justice system, and that such a change would be 
unfortunate).
177
 The court wrote:
Let us assume that there are 10 manufacturers and a population of 
10 million persons exposed to their product. Assume that among 
this population 1,000 cancers of a certain type could be expected, 
but that 1,100 exist, and that this increase is “statistically 
significant,” permitting a reasonable conclusion that 100 cancers 
are due to the product of the manufacturers.  In the absence of 
other evidence, it might be argued that as to any one of the 1,100 
there is only a chance of about 9% (100/1100) that the product 
caused the cancer. . . . Since no plaintiff can show that his or her 
cancer was caused by any one of the defendants, they should
divide the $100,000,000 by 1,100, giving each a recovery of about 
$90,000. 
Id. at 838-39.
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Orange settlement.178  Statistical, pro rata distribution of damages was 
used because of the problem of indeterminate defendants and 
indeterminate plaintiffs.179  Recognizing the relative novelty of this 
approach, the judge wrote:  “We are in a different world of proof than 
that of the archetypical smoking gun. We must make the best estimates 
of probability that we can using the help of experts such as statisticians 
and our own common sense and experience with the real universe.”180
Statistical causation in mass tort cases is generally shown by the 
use of epidemiological studies.  These are used to “determine whether 
there is a statistical association between defendant’s product and 
plaintiff’s disease by comparing the incidence of disease in those 
exposed to defendant’s product with the disease’s background rate.”181
Epidemiology is the branch of medical science that employs integrated 
178
 In re Agent Orange Prods. Liab. Litig., 597 F. Supp. 740 (E.D.N.Y. 1984); 
see also Peter H. Schuck, Agent Orange on Trial (1986) (describing trial and 
resolution, including process of arriving at settlement).
179 Id. at 840-43.  The court later wrote that causation could not be established 
to allow liability.  See In re “Agent Orange” Prod. Liab. Litig., 611 F. Supp. 1223, 
1229 (E.D.N.Y. 1985) (granting summary judgment to defendants against plaintiffs 
who had opted out of certified class, since plaintiffs could not show a “causal link 
between exposure to Agent Orange and the various diseases from which they are 
allegedly suffering”), aff’d, 818 F.2d 187 (2d Cir. 1987); In re “Agent Orange” Prod. 
Liab. Litig., 611 F. Supp. 1267 (E.D.N.Y. 1985) (also granting summary judgment 
against an opt-out plaintiff), aff’d, 818 F.2d 187 (2d Cir. 1987).
180 Id. at 838; see also In re Joint Eastern & Southern Dist. Asbestos Litigation, 
52 F.3d 1124, 1131 (2d Cir. 1995) (“Causation in toxic torts normally comprises two 
separate inquiries: whether the epidemiological or other scientific evidence 
establishes a causal link between c (asbestos exposure) and d (colon cancer), and 
whether plaintiff is within the class of persons to which inferences from the general 
causation evidence should be applied.”); Rosenberg, supra note 103, at 859-60 
(advocating proportional liability for defendants “in proportion to the probability of 
causation of harm” to the plaintiff class members).  But cf. Wright, supra note 7, at 
1822-23 (arguing that mere statistics, even when based on causal generalizations, 
cannot adequately show legal causation).
181
 Berger, supra note 129, at 2125-26; see also Gold, supra note 129, at 384 
(discussing phenomena of increased risk and enhanced probability of harm).
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use of statistics to “to identify and establish the causes of human 
diseases.”182  As one writer notes:
The hallmark of epidemiology is that it is based on the 
study of populations, not individuals.  It seeks to 
establish associations between alleged causes and 
effects by one of two methods: either comparing the 
incidence of disease across exposed and unexposed 
populations, or comparing the incidence of exposure 
across sick and healthy populations.  With proper 
scientific interpretation, these correlations lend great 
weight to an inference of causation.183
3.  Application to Attenuation in Reparations
The same tools used in the mass tort context can be used to address 
legal attenuation concerns in reparations.  We will examine each type 
of attenuation here.
a.  Act Attenuation
Overcoming act attenuation requires showing a link between the 
harm done to slaves and the harm to modern slave descendants.  As in 
the mass tort context, this link can be shown using statistical tools.  
This would require some coordination, including running a rigorous 
and controlled statistical study prior to bringing suit. 184
The basic design of a study to demonstrate causation would 
probably be along these lines:  The alleged harm is poverty; it should 
be possible to establish whether or not poverty has a higher incidence 
182 See generally Bert Black & David E. Lilienfeld, Epidemiologic Proof in 
Toxic Tort Litigation, 52 Fordham L. Rev. 732, 736 (1984).
183
 Gold, supra note 129, at 380.
184 Cf. Twerski & Sebok, supra note 127, at 1404, 1409 (suggesting that novel 
cases particularly benefit from the use of statistical data). Of course, such a study 
may be complex and difficult to perform.  See Berger, supra note 129, at 2127-28 
(noting the difficulty of conducting epidemiological studies).
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among slave descendants than among the general populace.  It can be 
established that slave descendants currently hold some value, X.  
Applying statistical tools, it may be possible to show that they would 
have held some greater amount, X + Y.  The premise seems likely, 
given the well-known economic disparities between Blacks and 
members of other races.185 The reasoning would go (to adapt the 
language previously used by Judge Weinstein in the Agent Orange 
litigation):
Let us assume . . . a population of 10 million persons 
exposed to [slave descent]. Assume that among this 
population 1,000 [instances of poverty] could be expected, 
but that 1,100 exist, and that this increase is “statistically 
significant,” permitting a reasonable conclusion that 100 
[instances of poverty] are due to the [slave descent].186
Such analysis can put a solid number on the question of how slaves’ 
lost property and lost wages affect Blacks today.
Reparations advocates can also point to existing cases to suggest 
that slavery is the type of harm where liability is appropriate despite 
underdetermination.  The harms inflicted under slavery were 
intentional, not negligent, which is one indicator of potential 
liability.187  The harm, against slaves and their children, was also 
foreseeable, another potential indicator of liability.188  The very act of 
slavery carries an “air of culpability” which some commentators 
suggest is another indicator of liability.189  Other factors also weigh in 
185 See supra note 40  (noting these statistics).  
186
 In re “Agent Orange” Litig., 597 F. Supp. 740, 837 (E.D.N.Y. 1984).
187
 Twerski & Sebok, supra note 127, at 1385-86.
188 Id. (foreseeability of harm).
189 Id.; see also Wenger, supra note 1, at 202 n.34 (noting argument that slavery 
was a violation of natural law); Randy E. Barnett, Essay, Was Slavery 
Unconstitutional Before the Thirteenth Amendment?: Lysander Spooner’s Theory of 
Interpretation, 28 Pac. L.J. 977, 988-1014 (1997).
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favor of liability: Slaves were subjected to inhuman treatment,190 and 
an argument can be made that slavery was a valueless act.191
b.  Victim Attenuation
Because of the relation between the legal concerns of act and 
victim attenuation in reparations, statistical causation concepts that 
address act attenuation can also address victim attenuation.  As noted 
by the Slave Descendants court, the victim attenuation concern is 
whether claimants can establish a concrete harm.  Use of statistical 
evidence can demonstrate that concrete harm, overcoming one 
important hurdle for repar ations.  
The conceptual underpinning for overcoming victim attenuation is 
simple enough. It is certainly true, as the Slave Descendants court 
notes, that any number of eventualities could have deprived plaintiffs 
of receiving economic benefits from their ancestors.  The plaintiffs’ 
ancestors may have chosen to spend their wealth on themselves192 or 
donate it to charity.  They may have chosen to give it to certain 
favored children, and plaintiffs’ particular lines of parentage might 
have been unrepresented.  Even if plaintiffs’ ancestors had fully 
intended to pass on their wealth, they may have been unable to do so.  
They may have needed assets to deal with daily expenses or 
emergencies, and had no money to pass on.  They may have been poor 
money managers, losing their assets in unwise investment.193  They 
may have been victims of the many financial uncertainties that the 
190 See Malone, supra note 126, at 95 (noting that “inhuman treatment” was a 
factor in court finding causation).
191 See id. at 86 (noting that courts are more likely to find causation if harmful 
act is not valuable to society); but cf. Wenger, supra note 1, at  238-40 (noting the 
economic value of slavery to the country). 
192
 This is a reasonable possibility.  There is no indication that plaintiffs intend 
to pass on parts of any recovery to their descendants, rather than simply consuming 
it.  See also Hylton, Slavery, supra note 22, at 39 (“Precariousness would have given 
the slave a strong incentive to spend his money on his own desires right away.”).
193 See id. (“The problem that remains is the passage of time, which allows for 
many opportunities for money to be squandered or used in other ways.”).
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country has seen, losing money to market crashes, business 
competition, changing laws, wars, speculation, financial panics, 
currency fluctuation, and inflation.  
Every one of these is a possibility.  And yet, it is also possible that 
these ancestors, had they been paid for their labor, would have passed 
down some amount of wealth, which would have eventually come to 
the plaintiffs.194  This is not an unrealistic scenario either; many 
Americans enjoy some measure of inherited wealth.195  It is unrealistic 
to suggest that none of the slave descendants would have received 
inherited wealth.  The question is, what is the statistical likelihood of 
receiving wealth that was lost to slave descendants?196
194 And, as with other tort cases, the supposed breaks in the causal chain of 
harm to slave descendants are not particularly debilitating.  In particular, the court is 
concerned that it cannot verify that slave ancestors would have given their assets to 
their descendants.  This concern is overstated.  Giving assets to one’s children is a 
common course of action.  If the court were applying the doctrine of cy pres to 
decide where a party’s assets were to go, a natural destination would be a decedent’s 
descendants.  A similar principle, applied here, shows how strained the Slave 
Descendants court’s reasoning is.  In the absence of a will, what would slaves most 
likely have likely wanted done with their assets?  They most likely would have 
wanted them to go to their children.  Hylton, Slavery, supra note 22, at 39 (“In order 
to avoid reducing damages to descendants for a reason that was not only beyond the 
slave’s control but a foreseeable consequence of the initial injury, we should assume 
that if paid, he would have passed the money on at the same rate as parents in 
conventional families do.”).  But cf. Waldron, supra note 16, at 10 (noting 
“whimsical” nature of property disposition).
195 See generally Thomas M. Shapiro, The Hidden Cost of Being African-
American: How Wealth Perpetuates Inequality (2004) (discussing transfer of wealth 
between generations).
196
 Showing the statistical likelihood of inheritance answers the recurring 
critique that the amount of compensation is not calculable.  See Epstein, supra note 
125, at 9 (“We have no idea of how much of that profit (assuming that it could be 
calibrated) actually descended to the next generation.  The ordinary business will 
reinvest some share of its profits, but will declare some as dividends and pay some 
out in salaries to its employees.  Any dividends and wages do not descend to the next 
generation.”); Massey, supra note 9, at 164-65 (“It is impossible to know how much 
better off today’s black Americans would be, if at all. It is even more speculative to 
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To answer this, plaintiffs will need to show the statistical 
likelihood of present claimants receiving inheritance from slave 
ancestors, as well as the likely amount of any inheritance.  This 
number should be calculable.  Armed with such a number plaintiffs 
can assert to a judge that they are not merely showing a genealogical 
relationship; by depriving their ancestors of compensation, slave 
owners deprived the slaves’ descendants of a statistically measurable 
sum.197  Despite the possibility of intervening causes, plaintiffs have 
some statistically measurable, non-negligible chance of being the 
recipients of their ancestors’ wealth.198  (And it is almost certain that 
reparations defendants could not establish that they were not the cause 
of plaintiffs’ injuries.)
This could establish concrete harm and show standing.  Allowing 
statistical evidence to address the weak act attenuation concerns that 
lead to victim attenuation resolves the concerns of the Slave 
Descendants court.  The court expresses concern that the plaintiffs’ 
ancestors assets may have been dispersed due to intervening events.  
This is not an unreasonable concern, and is conceptually similar to the 
possibility of another factor leading to a tort claimant’s disease.  In 
both cases, it is appropriate to use statistics. 
try pinning a number on the loss suffered by any given contemporary individual
descendant of American slavery.”).
197
 This number may be smaller than commentators assume.  Indeed, economic 
studies suggest that, absent the presence of legal regimes to preserve wealth, it is 
difficult to keep fortunes together.  See generally John F. Hart, “A Less Proportion of 
Idle Proprieters”: Madison, Property Rights, and the Abolition of Fee Tail, 58 Wash. 
& Lee L. Rev. 167 (2001) (discussing the effect of fee tail and primogeniture in 
preserving wealth between generations).  Ironically, Blacks missed out on many of 
the devices, such as fee tail and primogeniture, designed to maintain wealth.  Thus, 
principles of corrective justice suggest that they should be given the benefit of every 
doubt on whether they would have kept wealth and passed it on to future generations.
198
 Of course, the question might be complicated by the potential need for a  
Daubert-approved statistical model in order to show standing.  
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c.  Wrongdoer Attenuation
Finally, the framework set out in Sindell and other DES cases 
provides a means of overcoming wrongdoer attenuation.  In Sindell, 
the court found that DES manufacturers could be held liable despite 
the inability of plaintiffs to connect directly the manufacturers to the 
plaintiffs’ harm.  That court noted, “as between an innocent plaintiff 
and negligent defendants, the latter should bear the cost of injury.”199
Similar reasoning applies in reparations.
Of course, there is a potential problem with applying the Sindell
reasoning.  In Sindell, tortfeasors comprising a large majority of the 
market were joined.200 Sindell used proportional liability, allocating 
liability between the defendants in proportion to their market share.201
In the reparations context, it may be difficult to apply Sindell since 
there are no dominant producers of slavery.  One possibility would be 
to join government actors.  Another would be to let plaintiffs use the 
“enterprise liability” theories where any actors in an enterprise can be 
found liable for harms it causes.202
D.  Recap
This Part has examined the idea of causation.  It is apparent that 
legal attenuation critiques, including the Slave Descendants court’s 
199
 26 Cal.3d at 610-11.
200 Id. at 611-12 (noting that joined defendants comprised 90 percent of the 
DES market).  
201 Id. at 612-13.
202 It is possible to argue that causal chains to wrongdoers may have been 
broken by natural acts of wealth disbursement.  However, cases have established that 
torts from a third party will not break the causal chain.  Robert L. Rabin, Enabling 
Torts, 49 DePaul L. Rev. 435, 439-48 (1999).  Some courts have found actors liable 
for financing the purchase of a car by a party likely to drive unsafely,  dropping off a 
passenger in a dangerous neighborhood,  or leaving a car parked, with keys in the 
ignition, in a neighborhood where it is likely to be stolen and cause damage. Id. at 
438-41.  If case law allows causation to be found for “enabling” acts even where a 
tortious act by a third party is required to bring the harm to fruition then it seems 
like, a priori, an “enabling” act that allows harm to occur by the passage of normal, 
non-tortious acts of wealth disbursement should be actionable.
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analysis, are oversimplified.  The question of causation in reparations 
requires analysis of underdetermined causation, which does not always 
preclude liability.  Slavery is a good candidate for liability despite 
underdetermined causation.  And reparations advocates should use the 
tools of mass tort, particularly statistical causation, to establish 
liability.   Statistical tools may be used to show harm to modern 
claimants, resolving legal concerns of victim and act attenuation.  And 
conceptual tools used in the DES and other cases can be used to 
address wrongdoer attenuation.
Use of mass tort tools is an application of a legal solution to the 
legal attenuation concerns.  Most importantly, on a strategic level, this 
analysis provides a means of potentially overcoming victim 
attenuation at the legal level.  As discussed above, that is a necessary 
step for moving forward with reparations.  Mass tort tools also provide 
means of dealing with other legal attenuation objections to reparations.
Conclusion:  Filling in the Gaps
Earlier in this Article, we discussed some strategic considerations.  
The Article suggested that reparations litigation was stalled at a 
dangerous point, and that it was crucial to get past the judicial 
gatekeepers to the next stages of public discourse and, eventually, 
settlement.
These strategic considerations remain paramount.  Reparations 
advocates must address attenuation, and they must do so effectively, 
meeting moral argument with moral and legal with legal, addressing 
each of the three major attenuation arguments.  The need to address 
legal arguments relating to victim attenuation is foremost.
This Article has suggested that many attenuation concerns can be 
addressed by looking to the mass tort jurisprudence and literature, and 
has set out some basic ideas which could be used as a framework in 
adapting the mass tort theory to reparations. Recall that, as previously 
set out in Chart 3, there are gaps in the responses to attenuation.  Those 
gaps were previously mapped:
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Repeat of Chart 3: Responses to Attenuation.
Legal Response Moral Response 
Wrongdoer 
Attenuation
Suits against government and 
corporations.
None (possibly group 
benefit)
Victim 
Attenuation
None Fairness, Group harm
Act
Attenuation
None (possibly social research) Fairness
This Article has worked to fill these gaps.  I have suggested that 
statistical causation may provide a means of avoiding the problems of 
victim and act attenuation in the legal sphere.  I have also suggested 
that Sindell harm contribution analysis may be used to address legal 
concerns of wrongdoer attenuation.  These advances modify the chart 
as follows:
Chart 6:  Modified Catalog of Responses to Attenuation
Legal Response Moral Response 
Wrongdoer 
Attenuation
Suits against government and 
corporations.  Sindell harm 
contribution analysis.
None (possibly group 
harm)
Victim 
Attenuation
Lack of harm (standing) 
concerns addressed by 
showing harm through 
statistical means, as in mass 
torts.
Fairness, Group harm
Act 
Attenuation
Possibly social research.  
Statistical proof may also 
show causation
Fairness
Much remains to be done.  Reparations advocates must test the 
statistical causation arguments to see if they satisfy courts’ lack of 
harm and standing concerns.  The argument should be further 
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developed and refined for use in showing causation at trial, ultimately 
addressing act attenuation concerns that arise at that stage.   And the 
Sindell harm contribution analysis should be employed as needed to 
address wrongdoer attenuation. Despite the work that remains to be 
done, this Article shows that there is a theoretical foundation for 
addressing attenuation.
Throughout this Article, I have employed the terminology of legal 
arguments and moral arguments.  But in the final analysis, the lines are 
a little more blurred.  Many so-called legal arguments are, at their 
core, based on moral policy decisions.203  Legal arguments are moral, 
but they are a special subset of moral arguments, and the legal 
critiques of reparations must be given a legal response. 
Some reparations advocates suggest that they cannot win at law, 
and that it is therefore necessary to employ moral arguments, rather 
than legal arguments.  In this Article, I take the opposite tack.  I agree 
that the end resolution will likely be outside of court, but what seems 
to be needed right now is a legal hook to move the debate forward.  
Therefore, I have proposed a technical framework that should aid in  
carrying forward the moral argument.
Of course, once reparations cases have demonstrated some chance 
of success in courts, reparations advocates must still advance a 
politically feasible case for settlement.  The time to begin to lay the 
groundwork for this is now.  This Article has not examined potential 
solutions for the moral concerns of attenuation.   However, I will set 
203 Proximate cause is a legal creation, designed to cut off liability at a rather 
arbitrary point. As such, it has been criticized.  For example, scholars writing about 
the history of the legal requirement of causation note that it arose from cases 
involving damage caused by railroad sparks, and courts perceived a need to preserve 
capitalism. Mari Matsuda, On Causation, 100 Colum. L. Rev. 2195, 2200 (2000).  
Thus, the existing rules of causation seeks stable, objective, and predictable 
outcomes, id. at 2201, and in the process serve to protect class interests, id. at 2202.  
Proximate cause is a policy choice.  Other, alternative choices exist.  See id. at 2195, 
2211 (suggesting that under current rules, those least able to correct a wrong are 
often considered its cause, and that causation should be expanded to cover other 
parties who have the ability to avoid or prevent a harm).
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out a few preliminary thoughts.  It is my hope to generate discussion 
about these ideas and to encourage the airing of other thoughts on how 
to address attenuation in the public discourse.
First, reparations advocates can focus on the idea of tainted 
property.  This argument would characterize modern citizens as 
innocent recipients of tainted property — their possession of tainted 
property may not be their fault, but they may still be responsible for 
recompensing the harm caused.  A second tactic is strengthening the 
historical research as well as establishing genealogical ties to slave 
ancestors for individual Blacks today.  This is necessary given the 
recurrence of ideas of victim attenuation.  A related concern is the 
further development of reparations plans, and in particular the tailoring 
programs to those who have been harmed.204  Reparations advocates 
may be able to avoid victim and act attenuation through the use of 
reparations plans can specifically target harmed slave descendants.  
One way to ameliorate resentment and wrongdoer attenuation is to 
place the burden on the widest possible segment of society, thus 
creating the least possible burden for any one payer.205  To this end, 
reparations programs should be broad in scope, and may seek to 
extend payment over a period of time.  Reparations advocates may 
suggest the development of ideas for  administrative solutions to the 
distribution of reparations.206  The widely accepted success of 
programs such as the September 11th Victim Compensation Fund 
might provide a model, as well as support for administrative 
distribution programs.207  Similarly, they can discuss the generational 
problem, and point out that, in cases of grave wrongdoing such as the 
204
 Brophy, Taking Reparations Seriously, supra note 34, at 31.
205
 Brophy, Taking Reparations Seriously, supra note 34, at 39.
206
 Jack B. Weinstein, Compensation for Mass Private Delicts: Evolving Roles 
of Administrative, Criminal, and Tort Law, 2001 U. Ill. L. Rev. 947, 971-74 (2001) 
(noting the ability of administrative bodies to assist in distributing payment for mass 
delicts).
207
 This might involve further examination of the corrective and distributive 
justice questions previously discussed.  
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Holocaust, the passage of time did not dilute moral responsibility.  
These ideas — and doubtless many others — can be developed by 
scholars as a next step to addressing moral concerns of attenuation.208
Given the difficulty in advancing reparations suits and proposed 
bills, it makes sense to explore legal and moral theories which can be 
used to explain and advocate reparations to judges, legislatures, and 
the public.  This Article has delineated between different types of 
attenuation in the reparations context.  It has discussed how ideas of 
statistical causation from the mass tort context may be used in the 
reparations debate.  It has also briefly sketched some ideas that could 
be developed to further address moral attenuation concerns.  By 
examining the nuances of the questions of causation and attenuation, it 
demonstrates the possibility of showing causation in reparations. 
Indeed, it turns out that attenuation, like other concerns about 
reparations, may provide “grist for the mill of reparations critics, but 
[is] familiar in law, and the law has developed methods for dealing 
with (or ignoring) [it].”209
208 See also Brophy, Cultural War, supra note 3, at 1188.
209 See Posner & Vermeule, supra note 13, at 702 (making this statement about 
potential problems in determining compensation amounts and in making any 
distribution of restitution).
